MARCH 1973

MONTHLY REVIEW

AN INDEPENDENT SOCIALIST MAGAZINE

VOLUME 24

10

U.S. Defeat in Vietnam

THE EDITORS

The African Revolution

- Cabral — C. McCOLLESTER
- Mozambique — J. S. SAUL

On Discovering Marxism

PAUL SWEEZY

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MONTHLY REVIEW: Published monthly except July and August, when bimonthly, and copyright © 1973, by monthly Review, Inc. Second class postage paid at New York, N. Y.

EDITORIAL AND BUSINESS: 116 West 14th Street, New York, N. Y. 10011.
Telephone: (212) 691-2555.
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Telephone: 01-240-3151; 01-240-2300.
MR Edizione Italiana: Bari 70124, viale Orazio Flacco 15.
Telephone: 241919, 246157.

Unsolicited manuscripts will not be returned unless accompanied by a stamped, self-addressed envelope.

NEWSSTAND DISTRIBUITOR: B. De Boer, 118 High Street, Nutley, N. J.

SUBSCRIPTION PRICE: One year—$7 in the U.S.; $8 foreign.
By 1st Class mail—U.S. $12; elsewhere $14
By air mail—No. America $14; So. America and Europe $18; Asia (incl. USSR), Africa, Australia $20.

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NOTES FROM THE EDITORS

An explanation and an apology is called for about a statistic on the U.S. balance of payments used in the December 1972 and January 1973 *Review of the Month*. The December piece, "Balance of Payments and Empire," was devoted to a presentation and analysis of the International Economic Policy Association (IEPA) study, *The United States Balance of Payments: From Crisis to Controversy*. One of the significant contributions of the IEPA study was the statistical separation of the role of the government and private sectors in creating the balance-of-payments deficit. Thus the official U.S. Department of Commerce statistics show that in 1971 there was a $2.7 billion deficit in the merchandise trade balance (the amount, by which export of goods exceeded import of goods). However, the IEPA analysis showed that some $3.5 billion of merchandise exports were financed directly and indirectly by the government, e.g., via AID grants and loans, P.L.480 funds for agricultural exports, and Eximbank long-term loans. If these government-supported exports are subtracted from total exports we find that the merchandise trade deficit of the private commercial sector alone was close to $6.2 billion. This was the number given in Table 2 of the December *Review of the Month* (p. 7), where we presented the 1971 balance-of-payments summary for the private sector. The ana-

(*Continued on inside back cover*)

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THE IMPORTANCE OF CALLING A DEFEAT A DEFEAT

There has still been no official explanation of the Christmas-New Year's bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong, and the U.S. media, even those which were against the war, seem to be willing to forget the whole affair as though it had been a bad dream. The reasoning seems to be that the cease-fire is the important thing and that what led up to it now has only an historical interest.

We strongly disagree. To adopt this attitude is in effect to condone and excuse one of history's most barbarous acts. Americans of conscience can *never* forgive or forget this monstrous crime of Richard Nixon and his accomplices. But more than this is at stake, nothing less than the very meaning of the cease-fire. Therefore, unless or until the inside story is revealed, we must seek to establish the truth through careful examination of whatever clues may become available.

Let us begin with what Kissinger said about the bombing in his February 1 TV interview with Marvin Kalb of CBS. It is

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necessary to quote at some length to get the full flavor of Kissinger's "explanation":

The decision to resume bombing in the middle of December was perhaps the most painful, the most difficult, and certainly the most lonely that the President has had to make since he is—since he has been in office.

It was very painful to do this at that particular season, when the expectation for peace had been so high and only six weeks before his inauguration—it was very difficult to do it under the circumstances, when the outcome was not demonstrable.

There were really three parts to it: one, should we resume bombing; two, if we resume bombing, with what weapons (that involved the whole issue of the B-52); and, three, should we talk to the American people.

With respect to the first part—why did the President decide to resume bombing—we had come to the conclusion that the negotiations as they were then being conducted were not serious, that for whatever reason the North Vietnamese at that point had come to the conclusion that protracting the negotiations was more in their interest than concluding them. It was not a case that we made certain demands that they rejected; it was the case that no sooner was one issue settled than three others emerged, and as soon as one approached a solution, yet others came to the forefront. At the same time, the more difficult Hanoi was, the more rigid Saigon grew, and we could see a prospect therefore where we would be caught between the two contending Vietnamese parties with no element introduced that would change their opinion, with a gradual degeneration of the private talks between Le Duc Tho and me into the same sort of propaganda that the public talks in the Hotel Majestic had reached. And therefore it was decided to bring home really to both Vietnamese parties that the continuation of the war had its price, and it was not generally recognized that when we started the bombing again of North Vietnam we also sent General Haig to Saigon to make very clear that this did not mean that we would fail to settle on the terms that we had defined as reasonable.

So we really moved in both directions simultaneously. Once the decision was made to resume bombing, we faced the fact that it was the rainy season, and that really the only plane that could act consistently was the B-52 which is an all-weather plane. . . .

Now, why did the President decide not to speak to the American people?

The President can speak most effectively when he announces a new departure in policy and indicates what can be done to bring that particular departure to a conclusion.

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He could have done only two things in such a speech. One is to explain why the negotiations had stalemated, and, two, to explain under what circumstances he would end the bombing.

The first would have broken the confidentiality of the negotiations even more than was the case anyway through the exchanges that were going on publicly.

And the second would have made the resumption of talks an issue of prestige and might have delayed it. And therefore the President decided that if this action succeeded, then the results would speak for themselves in terms of a settlement.

And if a settlement was not reached, then he would have to give an accounting to the American people—to the American people—of all the action that led to the continuing stalemate.

On the face of it this is a jumble of obfuscation and evasion. Moreover, its effort to picture the United States as a sort of unwitting victim "caught between the two contending Vietnamese parties" and moving in an even-handed way "in both directions simultaneously," would be hilariously funny if it weren't at the same time so cynical and disgusting. Sending B-52s to Hanoi and General Haig to Saigon "to bring home to both Vietnamese parties that the continuation of the war had its price"—as though there were Vietnamese who didn't know, and as though one could make the equation: hundreds of B-52s = one General Haig.

But taken in the context of what had gone before, Kissinger's statement is something else: it is flagrantly and totally dishonest. How can what happened in December be even discussed without so much as a mention of what had happened in October? Kissinger knows better than anyone else that he had negotiated an agreement in October which had been expressly, and without any subsequent denial, accepted by Nixon in a cable to the North Vietnamese Premier. Nixon asked not for changes in the agreement but for a postponement of the signing, presumably to give him time to arrange matters with Saigon. It is perfectly absurd for Kissinger to assert that Hanoi had suddenly and inexplicably decided to protract the negotiations in November and December: the fact, known to the whole world, is that *hardly a day went by without the North Vietnamese demanding the immediate signature of the already agreed-upon October settlement.* The question Kissinger should

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have answered is why the United States reneged.* And this is the question which Nixon too would have had to answer or evade if he had decided to go on TV and try to justify the resumption of the bombing. With an answer he could have given a real explanation, but it is pretty clear by now that this is the one thing he was and is absolutely determined not to do. Without an answer to this question, any proffered "explanation" could only have sounded trivial and grotesquely out of proportion to the enormity of the acts about to be committed. No wonder Nixon decided to remain silent.

In this space last month we argued the case that the real reason Nixon went back on the October agreement was that the Pentagon didn't like it because of its negative implication for the survival of the Saigon regime, and won Nixon over to its side. "One can only speculate," we wrote, "that Kissinger, whose views [in favor of a negotiated agreement] are known from the 1969 *Foreign Affairs* article, won him [Nixon] over in October and then lost him to the Pentagon in November." Since then, new and important corroborative evidence has become available. William P. Clements, Jr., in Senate hearings on his appointment to the position of Deputy Secretary of Defense, shocked people all over the world by refusing to exclude the use of nuclear weapons in Vietnam. "Clements Won't Rule Out A-Bomb Use," ran the headline in the *New York Times* (January 12). But this, though monopolizing the headlines, was not the only revelation of Clement's testimony. Further along in the *Times* story we read:

> In a discussion of the heavy December bombing raids over North Vietnamese cities, Mr. Clements startled the Senate Armed Services Committee, where he was testifying, by saying that Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had suggested the bombing as "a contingency plan."
>
> "Moorer was consulted," Mr. Clements said. "He did understand the whole operation.

* Avoiding this question was of course made easier for Kissinger by the failure of his TV interviewer to put it to him. This kind of tacit collusion between the media and the administration to suppress really damaging information is typical. The administration's pretense that it is being abused by the media is in reality nothing but a device to bludgeon editors and reporters into becoming even more pliant tools of the government propaganda apparatus.

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"Admiral Moorer helped make the plan for the December 18 bombing."

December 18 was the date the heavy raids began following a breakdown of the peace talks in Paris.

Mr. Clements added, "In my new capacity, I may have said something I shouldn't have said, but I don't think so."

Senator John C. Stennis, Democrat of Mississippi who is the committee chairman, said, "It was inferred to this committee that the President acted unilaterally" in ordering the bombing.

Why all the mystery? Why, even after the bombing is over and the cease-fire agreement is in effect, must it be made to appear that the whole operation was solely Nixon's responsibility?

The most plausible answer, it seems to us, is that only in this way can the real purpose of the bombing be hidden. If the role of the military in vetoing the October agreement and planning the raids were generally known, it would be pretty obvious that the purpose of the bombing was to force Hanoi to accept Nixon's new (really old) terms, i.e., to win a military victory. And in that case, what actually happened—the halting of the raids and the acceptance by the United States of an agreement essentially the same as that rejected in October—would be seen for what it is, i.e., a stunning *defeat*. From Nixon's point of view it is crucial that all this should be kept secret, that the breakdown of negotiations should be blamed on Hanoi (as in Kissinger's TV interview quoted above), and that the bombing should be pictured as the masterstroke which brought the North Vietnamese back to "serious" negotiations and to the acceptance of an allegedly much altered agreement. In this way defeat is turned into victory and an agreement unacceptable in October can be hailed as "peace with honor."

In all this we can see what bids fair to become the making of a new myth, the myth of America's victorious war in Vietnam. As an example of this myth-making process, take Henry Cabot Lodge's Op-Ed article in the *New York Times* of February 3rd under the ringing title, "A Diplomat's Hail to His Chief." Lodge tells us of his own pessimism about the possibilities of achieving a negotiated settlement during the years when he served first as Ambassador to Saigon and later as Nixon's representative to the Paris peace talks. In 1969, he says, "Hanoi had no incentive to negotiate seriously, because they were confident that President

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Nixon's diplomatic hand was weakened both by war-weariness at home and by the insecure allied military position in the South. . . . Only the success of the President's patient, long-headed policies in turning around the conditions of 1969 has made a settlement possible in 1973." Lodge then bids us look at the changes brought about by these policies:

- In bringing home half a million troops, President Nixon rallied public support in the United States for the U.S. government's efforts to bring about an orderly and equitable end to the war.
- In turning the U.S. combat role over to the strengthened regular forces, he made possible a shift from an effort based largely on conventional military strategy, which in spite of much sacrifice and skill had not solved the problem, to a greater reliance on the more effective territorial and local approach which can only be carried out by an indigenous force.
- He hurt the enemy's resupply and staging system badly in Cambodia and Laos.
- He established new relations with Hanoi's major allies in Peking and Moscow.
- He helped to counter North Vietnam's Easter invasion by the bombing and mining counteroffensive that began last May.

In the first of these items, placating rising antiwar sentiment is equated with rallying public support. The second is pure gobbledegook. If the third were true, how come the U.S.-Saigon invasions of Cambodia and Laos were smashed and how did the liberation forces manage to bring supplies to the South, including tanks and heavy artillery, in preparation for the 1972 spring offensive? The fourth is true but without any demonstrable relation to the course of the war in Vietnam. And the last item would not have had to be added at all if the claims made in the others were correct.

After this brilliant piece of argumentation, Lodge proceeds to his rhapsodic conclusion:

These actions radically changed the negotiating situation. Last October, Hanoi finally dropped its demand for dismantling the government of South Vietnam and entered serious talks—and now the settlement that eluded us for so long has been negotiated, with solid expectations for peace in Laos and Cambodia as well.

This is an outcome worth all the work and all the waiting. It is surely more secure and more specific than the "fade-out"

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I long believed we would have to accept. . . . I not only gladly admit I was wrong in doubting that the other side could be induced to take so constructive and auspicious a formal step toward peace; I also say "hail to the chief" whose courage and tenacity have made the decisive difference.

What really happened of course was very different. Nixon's policy of Vietnamization was a total fiasco, suffering crushing defeats in Cambodia and Laos, and finally in the spring offensive. It was these defeats, capped by the failure of Nixon's late-December bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong, which "radically changed the negotiating situation," leaving him no alternative but to withdraw U.S. forces on substantially the same terms the French were obliged to accept after their defeat at Dienbienphu in 1954. Chapter I, Article 1 of the agreement signed on January 27th states simply and clearly: "The United States and all other countries respect the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Vietnam as recognized by the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam." One gets the full measure of U.S. "victory" when one reflects that the United States (1) refused to accept the Geneva Agreements in 1954; (2) immediately set out to subvert them by installing a neocolonial puppet regime in Saigon; and (3) has fought the longest war in U.S. history to maintain the principle and the reality of two Vietnams.

But, one may ask, why hammer away at the theme of U.S. defeat in Vietnam? Why not let the ruling class's politicians and ideologists save face with claims of victory if it gives them any satisfaction? The answer is that what is at issue is not a matter of innocent face-saving. It is whether the American people, who have been brutally lied to and deceived over Vietnam, are now at last going to get a chance to discover the truth, not only about Vietnam but also (and in the long run even more important) about how they are governed and led. If blackguards like Nixon, who murder and maim and destroy in the interests of a blood-sucking social system, are now to be whitewashed and their crimes turned into virtues, there is a grave risk that all the sobering and cleansing lessons that can be learned from the country's quarter-century involvement in Vietnam will be lost forever. And against this we must fight as

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determinedly as we would against further imperialist aggressions by the U.S. ruling class, in Vietnam or anywhere else in the world.

Here we ought to pause to ask how great really is the danger that Nixon will go back into Vietnam in case things seem to be going badly for the Saigon regime. He has already said that the United States recognizes only Thieu's government in South Vietnam, which is in obvious violation of the agreement since the latter not only recognizes the existence of the Provisional Revolutionary Government but is signed by the PRG as one of the four agreeing parties. On the face of it, this would seem to be laying the ground for possible future intervention on behalf of Saigon. And yet here too we have to take account of the realities of the situation. If the picture of Nixon having turned the negotiating situation around and forced Hanoi to agree to his terms were accurate, we would have to rate the danger of re-intervention as very real indeed. But if, as we have argued, the truth is the other way around, i.e., that Nixon's Vietnamization policy suffered a decisive defeat and it was the United States which had to agree to Hanoi's terms, then the situation is very different. For in that case going back into Vietnam would be like deliberately entering a trap from which one has just managed to escape. And even Richard Nixon would surely think long and hard before committing such an obviously self-defeating act. In addition, there are two other factors which tend to reduce the danger of re-intervention. First, it is hard to imagine circumstances arising in Vietnam which would move any significant section of the American people to support U.S. re-involvement in what is now universally recognized as a hated war. If Nixon, having assured the country that he had achieved "peace with honor," were so rash as to try to commit it once again to war, he would almost certainly isolate himself politically even more thoroughly than Johnson did in his last year in office. It is not impossible, strange things have happened in the Vietnam war, but it hardly seems likely. Second, the U.S. ruling class, caught up in another international monetary crisis so soon after the cease-fire, would certainly react strongly against a move which could only make it much worse.

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For all these reasons, the danger of U.S. re-involvement, while not nonexistent, seems as of now to be rather remote.

It is well, however, to close on a note of caution. Those on the U.S. Left—and we include ourselves among them—who have tended to assume that American withdrawal from Vietnam will be followed by the more or less rapid disintegration of the Saigon regime had better not let our hopes run away with us. The situation in South Vietnam is extraordinarily complicated and without historical precedent. Long years of imperialist occupation and savage warfare have shattered the old framework of an essentially peasant society. Millions of refugees have been herded into the cities and deprived of their normal means of livelihood. Hundreds of thousands have been forced into the role of compradors or other kinds of parasites, a few accumulating great wealth in the process, many more being reduced to the depths of poverty and degradation, but all with some sort of stake in the status quo. The Thieu dictatorship has one of the largest and best equipped military establishments in the world, no match in battle for the revolutionary liberation forces but doubtless with a fearful repressive potential. A continuing flow of U.S. subsidies will stave off outright economic collapse. What will come of all this no one can now say with certainty. Perhaps the revolutionary forces which have already accomplished wonders will be able to sweep it all away and set about the arduous task of rebuilding the country and the lives of its people: this is of course the fervent hope of all decent people everywhere. But it seems more likely that a difficult period of struggle still lies ahead, one in which not only Vietnamese but also Americans can and should be involved. For it is perfectly certain that without massive U.S. economic and logistical support, the Saigon regime would indeed rapidly disintegrate. And it must be one of the top priorities of the Left in this country, including all antiwar and anti-imperialist forces, to do everything possible to reduce and eventually cut off altogether this flow of poison still being poured into the bloodstream of South Vietnam.

(February 12, 1973)

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THE AFRICAN REVOLUTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE

The following two articles, which we have been planning to publish for several months, assume a sad timeliness in view of last month's assassination of Amilcar Cabral, leader of the national liberation struggle against Portuguese rule in Guinea Bissao. As Charles McCollester's article makes clear, Cabral was a revolutionary thinker of enormous power and creativity, perhaps the greatest yet produced by the African continent. And John Saul's article on Mozambique provides convincing evidence that creative revolutionary theory, much influenced by Cabral and the successes of his movement in Guinea Bissau, is increasingly being put into practice elsewhere in Africa.—The Editors

THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF AMILCAR CABRAL

By Charles McCollester

Amilcar Cabral is gradually gaining recognition as the most original and significant African revolutionary thinker to appear since the death of Frantz Fanon. This reputation is strengthened by the concrete progress made by the PAIGC (Partido Africano da Independencia da Guiné e Cabo Verde) over the last ten years toward the goal of national liberation from Portuguese domination. What most characterizes the thought of Cabral is a combination of careful, painstaking, theoretical analysis and reflection with a patient, step-by-step application of theory to the practical questions of winning a war and constructing a new society. The avoidance of rhetoric and the emphasis on analysis founded on practice give his thought as much interest on the level of method as on the

Charles McCollester is travelling and studying in West Africa. He formerly taught philosophy in Gary, Indiana, where he was active in the antiwar movement.

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level of theory. His theories (the subject of this article) have a great deal of significance for Third World revolutionaries, but his approach to revolutionary theory, his method, is significant for American radicals as well.

Of Cape Verdean origins, Cabral had access to education.* He obtained an engineering degree in agronomy and began work as an agricultural consultant to the Portuguese government and to private firms in Angola and Guinea. In 1953, Cabral carried out an agricultural census of Guinea, which gave him a unique opportunity to visit the entire country and determine the needs and possibilities of development, as well as study the social structure and the differences existing between the various ethnic groups.

About the same time, Cabral, with other young African intellectuals from the Portuguese colonies (including Agostinho Neto and Mario de Andrade, later leaders of the MPLA), began what he called the "re-Africanization of our minds." This led eventually to the formation of the PAIGC, with Cabral as its secretary. At first, the PAIGC concentrated its efforts in the cities among the small groups of wage workers mainly located in the capital, Bissao, the most important of these being the dockworkers. These groups were easily organized and became the nucleus of the party's activity. Cabral notes, "we thus found our little proletariat."[1]** The crucial turning point came on August 3, 1959, when the Bissao dockworkers at Pidgiguiti began a strike for higher wages. They were attacked by the police and some 50 people lost their lives, while more than 100 were wounded. The Pidgiguiti massacre forced a reappraisal of strategy on the party. A decision was taken to strengthen the organization in the towns but to keep it clandestine, avoiding all demonstrations. The most significant decision was "to mobilize and organize the peasant masses who will be the main force in the struggle for national liberation."[2]

It was this situation which demanded a rethinking of revolutionary theory to fit the particular conditions of exploita-

* He was one of the 14 Africans of Guinea-Cabo Verde to receive university training from the Portuguese before 1960.

** Numbered notes will be found at the end of the article.

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tion and regression in Portugal's African colonies. It is Cabral's response to this situation, his analysis of the role of social classes and culture in the struggle for national liberation, which contain ideas of great importance for revolution in Africa and enrich the general body of revolutionary theory.

Cabral begins his analysis of the possibility of socialism, of revolution in underdeveloped countries, by clarifying a basic Marxian teaching, that "all history is a history of class struggle." For him, class struggle is the motive force only in a specific historical period—the period associated with the formation of states, the growth of towns, the accumulation of private wealth and the writing of history:*

> This means that *before* the class struggle—and necessarily *after* it . . . one or several factors was and will be the motive force of history. It is not difficult to see that this factor in the history of each human group is the *mode of production*—the level of productive forces and the pattern of ownership—characteristic of that group. Furthermore . . . classes themselves, class struggle and their subsequent definition, are the result of the development of the productive forces in conjunction with the pattern of ownership of the means of production. It therefore seems correct to conclude that the level of productive forces, the essential determining element in the content and form of class struggle, is the true and permanent motive force of history.[3]

Without this clarification, one condemns certain peoples of Africa to the sad position of being peoples without a history. And one allies oneself with the colonialist theory that it was imperialism which brought Africa into history.

> We are African peoples, we have not invented many things, we do not possess today the special weapons which others possess, we have no big factories . . . but we do have our own hearts, our own heads, our own history. It is this history which the colonialists have taken from us. The colonialists usually say that it was they who brought us into history; today we show that this is not so. They

* The difficulty is seen to be more apparent than real if, as did Engels, one reads Marx's dictum as "all written history—being the history of class society—is a history of class struggle." If one takes it in this way, then one avoids the false and dangerous implication that "primitive" societies (with little or no class divisions) have no history. Engels specifies in a footnote to the 1888 English edition of the *Manifesto* that the history referred to is *written* history. "In 1847, the pre-history of society, the social organization prior to written history, was not very well known."

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made us leave history, our history, to follow them, right at the back, to follow the progress of their history. Today in taking up arms to liberate ourselves . . . we want to return to our history, on our own feet, by our own means and through our own sacrifices.[4]

Colonialism was the paralysis or deviation of one people's history in favor of the acceleration of the historical development of other peoples. Stagnation, paralysis, and even regression have marked the influence of imperialism on the historical process of the dominated peoples. This is not to say that colonialism has had little influence on colonial peoples. While the lowest orders of the population (the peasants in the countryside) remain the least affected, the money economy with the imposition of cash crops and the growth of cities with a native petty bourgeoisie and working class have effected profound changes in the life of the colonized. But this historical development is subordinate to the historical development of the imperialist power. "The moment imperialism arrived and colonialism arrived, it made us leave our history and enter another history."[5] However, while imperialism blocks the autonomous development of the productive forces of the colonized and thus also represses the development of its culture and history, nonetheless in establishing new relations of production between disparate peoples, it gives birth to a sense of nationalism and thus a new source of resistance to colonial rule.

One of the internal demands of the colonialist or neocolonialist system is an accurate and detailed knowledge of the colonized. Imperialism, especially in its neocolonial phase, has led to an explosion of studies (historical, ethnographic, cultural, linguistic, etc.) on "primitive" or "underdeveloped" peoples.[6] These studies, whether specifically intended for that purpose or not, have been used to pacify and control the subject peoples. It is Cabral's intent to turn the weapon of analysis around, to examine and analyze the culture of dominated societies in function of the struggle against imperialism—"to determine which factors accelerate or brake the struggle by exercising a positive or negative influence on its development."[7]

To determine the capacity of resistance of a colonized people, it is necessary to consider what constitutes the identity

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of a social group. For Cabral, identity is not an immobile quality, because the biological and sociological factors which define it are in permanent evolution. Thus identity is always an inexact, relative quality. Also, though the biological factor is the indispensable material base for the existence and evolution of identity, it is the sociological factor which, in giving it content and form, gives it an objective meaning.

Identity is the expression of culture, and culture is itself founded on the economic reality of the group.

> If one considers that among these factors (economic, political, social, and cultural) which condition the evolution or the history of a society the economic is the fundamental, we can affirm that identity is, in some way, the expression of an economic reality. This reality . . . is defined by the level of productive forces (rapport between man and nature) and by the mode of production (the rapport between men and categories of men in the same society). But if we admit that culture is the dynamic synthesis of the material and spiritual reality of the society and expresses the relations between man and nature as well as between different categories of men within the society, we can affirm that identity is at the individual or collective level (and beyond the economic reality) the expression of a culture.[8]

Thus, since culture reposes on the economic and social structure, the possibility of resistance of a culture to foreign domination depends on the degree of destruction imposed on the social structure by this domination. Some cases of imperialist domination have led to the total destruction of the indigenous society—its immediate or progressive liquidation. But in Africa generally, imperialism has only partly destroyed or even only marginally affected the social structures of the native societies. Also, colonialism historically has been faced with a basic contradiction in its attitude toward the indigenous cultures. On the one hand it attempts to encourage ethnic differences and support traditional ruling groups in order to divide and rule, while on the other hand the dynamic of its own economic expansion demands the destruction of the social structure, culture, and identity of these groups. The horizontal nature of African society with its multiplicity of cultures and ethnic groups means that cultural resistance against imperialism will vary greatly from group to group. Hence the necessity

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for the African revolutionary to study the capacity for resistance (and the differences in history and social organization which explain variations of this capacity) of the various ethnic groups.*

It is also necessary to study the role of social classes among the colonized, their various strengths and weaknesses, in function of the struggle for national liberation. Drawing on the experience of the PAIGC, Cabral has had to recognize the marginal and isolated position of the working class in most African countries. This recognition led to the party's change of strategy after the Pidgiguiti massacre. While he points out that, in certain neocolonialist situations where economic development is much more developed than in Guinea, the role of the working class may be much more important, nowhere in Africa can it make the revolution alone. A second group which is important for the liberation struggle, but which must be classed as marginal as well, is the *déclassés* (or, as Cabral says, "what would be called the lumpenproletariat if there was a real proletariat"). He makes a distinction between the true *déclassés* (beggars, prostitutes, etc.) and the large numbers of unemployed young people, recently come from rural areas into the towns, who generally live at the expense of their families. Many of this latter group joined the liberation movement from the beginning, and this group generally has been an important source of party militants.

Though the peasantry is by far the largest and most important segment of the population, it is not the primary revolutionary force. This is especially true in Guinea where the Portuguese did not expropriate the land (as they did in Angola). The peasantry has kept its basic structure intact, with the land remaining the co-operative property of the village. Thus, rather than a system of direct exploitation (such as forced labor), the peasantry has been exploited indirectly through

* Cabral's experience in Guinea has shown that "stateless" groups such as the Balante (with common ownership of the soil, greater democracy, greater participation of women in the society) were much better adapted to the struggle than those whose structure can be characterized as "feudal"—groups such as the Peul whose traditional leadership collaborated with the Portuguese. For more details see "Brief Analysis of the Social Structure in Guinea," *op. cit.*, p. 56-76.

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trade, through the differences between the price and the real value of their products. Hence though their misery is real, its source is hidden. This makes the mobilization of the peasantry difficult. Also, their illiteracy, isolation, and fragmentation make it nearly impossible for the peasantry to elaborate a strategy capable of defeating a modern armed, technologically superior enemy.

However, from the point of view of cultural resistance, the peasantry is the guardian of the indigenous culture and is more or less impervious to the "civilizing mission" of the colonizer. The cultural occupation of the country is generally restricted to the capital and other urban areas; it is almost nil in the horizontal structure of the dominated society.

> The political and armed resistance of the people of the Portuguese colonies, as in the other countries or regions of Africa, was crushed by the technological superiority of the imperialist conqueror, with the complicity or treason of some of the native ruling classes. . . . But the cultural resistance of the African peoples was not destroyed. Suppressed, persecuted, betrayed by certain social categories who compromised with colonialism, African culture, surviving all the storms, found refuge in the villages, in the forests, and in the spirit of generations of the victims of colonialism. Like a seed which waits a long time for the conditions favorable to its germination . . . the culture of African peoples today begins again its expansion all across the continent in the struggles for national liberation.[9]

It is in the cultural integrity of the village and among the peasant masses that the source of national resistance is found. Cultural imperialism is "significantly felt only in the vertical of the colonial social pyramid—that part created by colonialism itself—and it concerns especially that category which one can call the 'native petty bourgeoisie' as well as a small number of workers in the urban centers."[10]

The core of Cabral's analysis can be found in his detailed study of the role of the native petty bourgeoisie. While the role of the petty bourgeoisie is generally marginal in advanced industrial societies, it is crucial in the colonial situation. This native petty bourgeoisie finds itself in an intermediate position between the foreign ruling class and the masses of the people, both of which have their own cultural identity. The petty

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bourgeoisie feels uprooted, alienated, since they are more or less assimilated to the dominant European culture; but they never feel completely secure in it. This class aspires to the status of "civilized," "evolved," or "assimilated" in order to be accepted as equals by the foreign rulers. It is the failure of this class to achieve this equality, its marginal position in the colonialist scheme, that pushes a part of it "toward the other pole of the socio-cultural conflict in the midst of which it lives —the native popular masses in search of an identity."[11]

Independence movements have generally been marked by an initial phase of cultural manifestations, by a "cultural renaissance" of the dominated people. These manifestations (such as Pan-Africanism, Negritude, etc.) have often been interpreted as the beginnings of resistance to foreign rule. For Cabral, however, such an interpretation is much too limited, and ignores the primordial role of culture in the development of the national liberation struggle.

> Such a limitation or such an error arises, it seems to us, from an incorrect generalization made on the basis of a real but limited phenomenon, situated on a given level of the vertical structure of the colonized societies—at the level of the elites or the colonial diaspora. Such a generalization ignores or forgets the essential given of the problem: the indestructible character of the cultural resistance of the people—the popular masses—toward foreign domination.[12]

This re-Africanization by the native intelligentsia is not a voluntary action. It is an imperious necessity, determined by the irreducible contradiction between the colonial power and the colonized, between the foreign exploiting class and the exploited masses, a contradiction which forces every native social group to define its position. But for this "return to the sources," this "re-Africanization," to have any historical consequences demands a "total and definitive identification with the aspirations of the popular masses, which contest not only the foreign culture, but also, globally, foreign domination. Otherwise, the 'return to sources' is nothing but a solution aiming at temporary advantages, a conscious or unconscious expression of political opportunism on the part of the petty bourgeoisie."[13]

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While thus guarding against an overestimation of the petty bourgeoisie's contribution to cultural resistance, Cabral strongly emphasizes the key role this group must play in the struggle for national liberation and revolution. Because this class is constantly in contact with the colonial power, it experiences most directly the humiliations, the injustices, the inequities of the system. Also, its middle position places it in contact with the popular masses so that it is able to grasp the general problems facing the nation. Finally, in most colonial situations it alone has the tools and skills necessary to initiate the liberation struggle or form a government when liberation is obtained.

To avoid the pitfall of opportunism, to avoid the gaining of a flag, a national anthem, and a native ruling class which act as a cover for foreign domination, in short, to avoid neocolonialism, it is necessary to have a clear idea of what one means by "national liberation." National liberation is "the inalienable right of every people to have its own history, and the objective of national liberation is to regain this right usurped by imperialism, that is to say, *to free the process of development of the national productive forces.*"[14] Thus the national liberation which aspires to do more than replace a foreign ruling class by a native one acting in their name must be a revolution. To regain one's history is to gain the liberation of the national productive forces.

These goals are much easier to formulate than to achieve. To succeed, the leadership of the struggle has to meet the "need for a rigorous analysis of the native social structure, of the tendencies of its evolution, and for the adoption in practice of appropriate measures for ensuring true national liberation."[15] Thus there is a need for a revolutionary vanguard which is able to distinguish true national independence from fictitious political independence. Since this vanguard is, of necessity in the colonial situation, largely recruited from the petty bourgeoisie this revolutionary sector of the petty bourgeoisie "must be capable of committing suicide as a class in order to be reborn as revolutionary workers, completely identified with the deepest aspirations of the people to which they belong."[16] The possibility of this depends on the level of development of revolutionary consciousness.[17]

One of the gravest errors of colonialism was its underes-

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timation of the cultural force of the African peoples, even to the point of denying the existence of any culture at all. Neocolonialism exercises a much more sophisticated system of control. Native literary elites are entertained and praised in America and Europe (especially in France). African art and literature are suddenly discovered as having value by the guardians of bourgeois culture. National liberation itself is held up as a creed by the more advanced of the old colonial powers. Cabral goes so far as to ask whether the national liberation movement is not an imperialist initiative. The objective of the imperialists in their abrupt about-face with regard to colonialism was to prevent the spread of socialism, "to liberate the reactionary forces in our countries which were being stifled by colonialism and to enable these forces to ally themselves with the international bourgeoisie."[18] Indeed it is Portugal's economic weakness which determines her rigid, archaic, colonial attitude, for Portugal "cannot allow itself the luxury of being neocolonialist."[19]

To combat the tendency toward neocolonialism, it is necessary to go beyond a simple affirmation of the value of African culture:

> Without a doubt, the underestimation of the cultural values of the African peoples, based on racist sentiments and on the intention to perpetuate their exploitation by foreigners, has done a great deal of harm to Africa. But, given the vital necessity of progress, the following attitudes are no less harmful: non-selective praise; the systematic exaltation of the virtues without condemning the failings; the blind acceptance of the values of a culture without considering what might be negative, reactionary, or regressive; . . . the absurd linking of artistic creations, whether valid or not, to some pretended racial characteristics; and finally, the non-scientific or a-scientific critical appreciation of cultural phenomena.[20]

Culture is a developing, dynamic thing. At least it should be when liberated from external repression. African culture is not something for museums, an object of curiosity for the ethnologist and the lovers of "folklore." Through the struggle for liberation it is revealed "how much the culture is, for the popular masses, an inexhaustible source of courage, of moral and physical resources, of physical and psychic energy, but

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also in certain aspects, of obstacles and difficulties, of erroneous conceptions of reality, of deviations in the accomplishment of duty and of limitations of the rhythm and efficiency of the struggle in relation to the political, technical, and scientific demands that it imposes."[21]

This balanced, critical approach to culture has led to the PAIGC's success in overcoming tribal divisions. The party has defended strongly the cultural differences of the various ethnic groups (languages, songs, dances, etc.), but at the same time has combatted vigorously all divisions on a political level. It is also reflected in the party's attitude toward the traditional religions:

> Another aspect which we consider very important is the religious beliefs of our people. We avoid all hostility towards these religions, towards the type of relationships our people still have with nature because of their economic underdevelopment. But we have resolutely opposed anything going against human dignity. We are proud of not having forbidden our people to use fetishes, amulets, and things of this sort. . . . It would have been absurd, completely wrong, to have forbidden these. We let our people find out for themselves, through the struggle, that their fetishes are of no use.[22]

> It is in the struggle that the positive and negative aspects of the culture are revealed, so that the development of the struggle is also an expansion and enrichment of the culture.[23]

The thought of Amilcar Cabral is of primary importance to the people of Africa in the struggles against colonialism and neocolonialism now going on across the continent. But in his insistence on the need for careful study and analysis of the particular historical situation of each nation, he recalls a vital but often ignored truth for any revolutionary movement: "We know that on the political level our own reality—however fine and attractive the reality of others may be—can only be transformed by detailed knowledge of it, by our own efforts, by our own sacrifices."[24]

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NOTES

1. "Brief Analysis of the Social Structure in Guinea," *Revolution in Guinea* (Monthly Review Press, 1971), p. 66.
2. Quoted in Basil Davidson, *The Liberation of Guiné* (London: Penguin, 1969), p. 32.
3. "The Weapon of Theory," *Revolution in Guinea*, p. 95.
4. "The Nationalist Movements of the Portuguese Colonies," *op. cit.*, pp. 77-78.
5. "Brief Analysis of the Social Structure of Guinea," *op. cit.*, p. 68.
6. See "Sur le rôle de la culture dans la lutte pour l'indépendence," lecture given at a "Meeting of Experts on the Notions of Race, Identity and Dignity," UNESCO, Paris, July 3-7, 1972 (mimeo distributed by the PAIGC, 21 pp.).
7. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 10.
9. "Libération Nationale et Culture," lecture given in memory of Dr. Eduardo Mondlane, University of Syracuse, February 20, 1970 (mimeo in French translation, distributed by PAIGC).
10. "Sur le rôle de la culture," *op. cit.*, p. 4.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 6.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
14. "The Weapon of Theory," *Revolution in Guinea*, p. 102 (emphasis added).
15. *Ibid.*, pp. 104-105.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 110.
17. Cabral remarks that "if national liberation is essentially a political problem, the conditions for its development give it certain characteristics which belong to the sphere of morals." *Ibid.*, p. 110.
18. "Brief Analysis of the Social Structure in Guinea," *op. cit.*, p. 71.
19. "The Nationalist Movements of the Portuguese Colonies," *op. cit.*, p. 79.
20. "Libération et Culture," p. 13.
21. "Sur le rôle de la culture," p. 17.
22. "Towards Final Victory," *Revolution in Guinea*, p. 160.
23. "La lutte armée de libération est non seulement un fait culturel, mais aussi un *facteur de culture*." "Libération Nationale et Culture," p. 17.
24. "The Weapon of Theory," *op. cit.*, p. 92.

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FRELIMO AND THE MOZAMBIQUE REVOLUTION

By John S. Saul

The presentation of a fully adequate account of the nature of the Mozambique liberation struggle, and of the revolution which has sprung from that struggle, would be a major undertaking. It would require an analysis of how the present situation has emerged from the complex history of the area. It would also require that the struggle in Mozambique be set clearly in its broader context—both the immediate context of the Southern African complex taken as a whole, as well as that of the world-wide balance of forces. And considerable attention would have to be paid to the logistics of the military confrontation and to a more precise delineation of the considerable progress being made in that sphere by Mozambican freedom fighters. To present such an account is not the intention of this brief essay; its more modest objective is to attempt to learn something significant about Mozambique by focusing on the recent development of the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), the move-

An earlier version of this essay was presented as a public lecture at the University of Lund, Sweden, in April 1970. It was substantially revised in 1972 for publication in Giovanni Arrighi and John S. Saul, *Essays on the Political Economy of Africa* (Monthly Review Press, forthcoming). John Saul taught political science at University College in Dar es Salaam for seven years before returning to his native Canada last year.

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ment which leads the resistance to Portuguese colonialism. This is important because the politics of FRELIMO have been much misunderstood: as I shall argue, FRELIMO's leadership crisis following Eduardo Mondlane's untimely assassination in 1969 was a mark of the movement's *growing strength*, not of its weakness, as unsympathetic or uninformed observers have sometimes tended to assume. This focus is also important because the developments which have taken place inside FRELIMO—and, more broadly, within liberated Mozambique as a whole—have implications which must be taken seriously by all who are committed to the liberation of Southern Africa.

Nationalism and Revolution

The denouement of the African nationalism which came to power in the late 1950s and early 1960s has almost invariably been a mere Africanization of the existing colonial structures. A distinctive pattern of external dependence and domestic hierarchy has emerged in post-colonial Africa which has served to choke off development rather than to liberate productive forces and release human energies. The domestic attributes of this syndrome are by now familiar:

(1) An educated elite, or petty bourgeoisie, controls the state, using it both to guarantee the neocolonial presence of international corporations and to gain privileged access to surpluses for themselves. Moreover, this group overlaps with a class of commercial Africans who are rising within the middle levels of the private sector (the "commanding heights" being the preserve of the international giants).

(2) The mass of the population is, at worst, terrorized and repressed; at best, demobilized and manipulated with the sideshow of tribal, communal, and religious competition.

(3) Political structures, whether they be those of one-party dominant systems or of outright military-cum-bureaucratic regimes, are primarily designed as instruments to facilitate such repression and/or manipulation in the interests of the newly dominant classes.

(4) Official ideologies—the vaguest of "nationalisms," the most meaningless of "African socialisms"—serve primarily to

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rationalize and legitimatize just such exploitative relations within the system.[1]*

These results were already prefigured in the nationalist movements themselves, as Frantz Fanon and Julius Nyerere, among others, have emphasized. Fanon's analysis of "the pitfalls of national consciousness" and of "false decolonization" are, of course, well known. But Nyerere's less familiar approach to this reality is almost equally instructive, for he summarizes precisely those aspects of the inheritance from the nationalist phase which have had negative implications for post-colonial Africa: leaders who desired, first and foremost, to occupy the privileged positions of the former exploiters; masses sufficiently confused by the more simplistic nostrums of nationalism to see such Africanization as a significant accomplishment, and yet very soon to become disillusioned and apathetic; political organizations too exclusively geared to the straightforward demands of nationalism and therefore destined to "lose support and . . . atrophy"; ideologies which easily degenerated into "racialism" (Nyerere's term) and mere black nationalism, providing no real defense against the underlying structures of capitalist exploitation. Being thus as aware of the ambiguities of nationalist assertion as of its very real achievements, Nyerere can only conclude:

> It is comparatively easy to get independence from a colonial power—especially one which claims to base its national morality on the principles of freedom and democracy. Everyone wants to be free, and the task of the nationalist is simply to rouse the people to a confidence in their own power of protest. But to build the real freedom which socialism represents is a very different thing. It demands a positive understanding and positive actions, not simply a rejection of colonialism and a willingness to cooperate in non-cooperation. *And the anti-colonial struggle will almost certainly have intensified the difficulties.*[2]

Here and there in independent Africa steps are being taken to challenge this pattern. In Tanzania, for example, Nyerere and his colleagues have made some real effort to break out of the impasse of conventional nationalism and increasingly to expose and remedy the contradictions which are masked by this

* Notes will be found at the end of the article.

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inheritance; it is a difficult task, as Nyerere is well aware and as I have had occasion to document elsewhere,[3] though it is not perhaps an impossible one. In any case, the problems of post-colonial Africa are not the immediate subject matter of this essay. Rather our focus is upon the nature of insurgent nationalism as it finds expression in the struggle to liberate Mozambique. And here we enter a world very different from that described by Nyerere, whose descriptions are in fact applicable to most of the rest of Africa. Of course, the struggle in Mozambique (as elsewhere in Southern Africa) is immediately distinguished by the nature of the colonial resistance to nationalist aspirations there, and by the strategies of sustained military confrontation which must, of necessity, be adopted. But this kind of struggle also detonates other processes which reshape the pattern of nationalism into a new mold and dictate, *in the nationalist phase itself*, an attempt to restructure social, economic, and political relationships in a fundamental way. This is what is happening in Mozambique; the conventional denouement of African nationalism becomes increasingly unthinkable as more and more fundamental choices are forced upon the people in the very course of waging their struggle. The result, in all likelihood, will be not merely national liberation, but a social revolution.

The Logic of Protracted Struggle

One crucial point must be made at the outset: all those features characteristic of the brand of nationalism which has facilitated false decolonization elsewhere on the continent have been present in the Mozambican context. Take first, the danger of elitist and entrepreneurial dominance both of the institutional expressions of nationalism and of the structures of the newly independent country (in this case, within the liberated areas of Mozambique). Inside FRELIMO there has been a continuing problem of coping with the demands of educated elements. Many educated Mozambicans abroad have been reluctant to return to take up positions in the ranks of a people's struggle, and have preferred instead to snipe at the organization from outside. Closer to home, the "educated" have often been equally intransigent about integrating themselves effectively with the masses, lured by inflated expectations of reward for their services

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and the example of their privileged counterparts in independent Africa. Such reactionary members of the petty bourgeoisie have been the backbone of the conservative line within the movement from the outset. And they have been joined by others who saw independence primarily as an opportunity for mere entrepreneurial aggrandizement and the consolidation of their own personal power. In the following section we shall observe this group in action in the new Mozambique.

The mass of the Mozambican population has suffered from many of the same disabilities, for revolutionary purposes, which characterize the African peasantry generally: a profound parochialism, for example, and an only slowly dawning awareness of the broader meaning of exploitation. Of course, the particularly brutal nature of Portuguese colonialism over the centuries, and of the repression of recent years, has rendered exploitation more graphic than in many other parts of the continent. But the danger that resistance to a vaguely perceived exploitation may take on a merely ethnic or regionalist expression remains real. Moreover, Mozambique has been no exception to the rule that to a significant degree the politicization of ethnicity in Africa springs from the manipulations of opportunistic elements of the leadership, who thus turn ethnic competition to their own uses.

The latter is, in any case, only one way in which a conservative petty bourgeoisie can seek to instrumentalize and demobilize the masses in the service of its own self-aggrandizement. In fact, a liberation movement can provide its own particular variation on this theme. FRELIMO's experience demonstrates that such elements will find themselves much more at ease with the intra-elite infighting of exile politics than with trusting their political fates to the less predictable and less easily controlled will of the newly mobilized masses in the liberated areas. The military line of such a group parallels this preference; when combined with nostalgia for the relatively easy ride to power of petty bourgeois leaderships elsewhere in Africa, the basic distrust of the masses and of a genuine release of energies leads to a putschist approach to the necessary armed confrontation with intransigent colonialism. Finally, a familiar ideological construct locks all these components into place: thus certain

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elements within FRELIMO have advanced a nationalism which asks no basic structural questions about the nature of the society being brought into being, and a racialism which ignores the broader meaning of exploitation in the interests of a mere Africanization of existing structures.

From the point of view of conservative members of the petty bourgeois leadership of the Mozambican independence struggle there has been just one flaw in all this: in the context of a genuine liberation struggle this kind of nationalism quite literally *does not work* as it did for African leadership groups elsewhere on the continent. On the contrary, for such a struggle to be waged successfully the energies of the masses *must* be released in a new way, the leadership *must* link its fortunes to the masses more effectively, and the imperialist enemy *must* be defined and confronted more meaningfully. In fact, once set in motion the reality of protracted struggle has increasingly imposed its own logic upon the Mozambican liberation movement.

What are the crucial dimensions of this "logic" of protracted struggle in Mozambique? We will sketch them only briefly here, though they are attested to in the publications of FRELIMO and, even more convincingly perhaps, in the eyewitness accounts of a number of visitors to the liberated areas of Mozambique in recent years.[4] Most important has been the need to close the gap between the leadership—a potential elite —and the mass of the peasantry, the need to evolve methods of work which render the contradiction between these two elements non-antagonistic and which promise to resolve it in a cumulatively progressive manner.

A number of items are relevant here. First, given the fact of Portugal's reprisals and its calculated destruction of much of the established infrastructure of economic and social life in areas where its military hold has faltered, entirely new institutions and programs have had to be begun in the liberated areas in the spheres of health, education, trade, and the like. Even day-to-day village life has been reorganized when villages were regrouped in more sheltered areas to minimize the dangers of direct attack, great efforts being made to render agricultural activities, in particular, safe and secure. Moreover, in the classic manner of guerrillas, FRELIMO combatants must be able to

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move freely from village to village without fear of betrayal; under such circumstances the peasantry has had to become the military units' active partners in struggle. As the existence of a secure military backdrop for penetration further south has become imperative, so the population has also been reorganized into an actual militia behind the front lines—this in spite of the severe constraint represented by a continuing shortage of firearms. A growing body of evidence suggests that each of these advances has begun to be effected as FRELIMO has consolidated its military advance. The most important implication of such a pattern is equally clear: that such advances involve something much more than "a rejection of colonialism and a willingness to cooperate in non-cooperation." On the contrary, they demand from the people "a positive understanding and positive actions." The knot of neocolonialism is being untied even at this very early stage.

Secondly, such a struggle has forced a deepening of national consciousness. What has been stated earlier concerning the inadequacy of certain varieties of "nationalisms" in Africa should not be taken to imply that national consciousness is unimportant: quite the opposite is the case. As noted, there is a potential for self-defeating divisiveness inherent in the realities of ethnic and cultural diversity which characterize every African territory. In addition, one of the main instruments of colonial oppression, not least in Portuguese Africa, was to "divide and rule" by means of intensifying such divisions. Under these circumstances, an achieved national identity represents a considerable accomplishment. It is therefore particularly important to affirm that a struggle like that in Mozambique actually *deepens* the meaning of such a national identity; it does not in any way bypass it. Cadres and guerrillas must be able to move easily into regions very far from their homes; tribesmen in one region must continue to appreciate that theirs is an involvement in a more long-range, territory-wide struggle even after their own immediate geographical corner has been liberated; others, beyond the front lines, must see that the struggle in the far north is more than just the tribal outburst the Portuguese would have them believe it to be. Such a nationalism cannot be some lowest common denominator masking a transitory alliance of tribally

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based notables. Not surprisingly, therefore, the spokesmen for the most militant line among the Mozambican leadership have responded with alacrity to this imperative; they have been increasingly firm about distinguishing *revolutionary nationalism* from its less savory look-alikes, and communicating this distinction to the populace.

To do this is also to deprive the least progressive members of the petty bourgeoisie of one of their trump cards—their manipulation of ethnic consciousness under the very umbrella of a vague and sloganized nationalism. Moreover the elite, *qua* elite, has been undermined in other ways by the dynamics of the struggle. Thus, both the carving out of liberated areas and the concomitant involvement of the populace introduce dimensions which slowly but surely displace the world of exile politics. Those politicians who have based their power upon links with the notables of host governments or with fellow exiles in Dar es Salaam and Lusaka must transform their practice or find their preeminence passing to others more closely linked to novel political forces within the contested territory itself. The military also yields to this logic of guerrilla warfare. A military apparatus dependent upon its ties to a mass base must develop methods of work which ensure its popular touch even while it provides leadership and raises the level of consciousness of the masses; those who cannot make the transition to being members of a real people's army are quickly spotted. As a direct result, the style and commitment which characterize cadres, rather than mere functionaries, become the order of the day both in the political and the military spheres.

In Mozambique, FRELIMO has slowly adjusted to these imperatives, though not without certain very real difficulties and tensions to which we will return in the following section. As it has done so, its further practice has tended both to consolidate these advances and even to push their logic further. If the people have, in effect, demanded cadres rather than functionaries (and new exploiters) from a movement which lays claim to their "positive understanding and positive actions," so too the movement has taken concrete steps to forestall its own possible degeneration. As a *line*, we have seen this to involve a deepening of the connotations of nationalism. It has also meant a

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conscious assault on the seeds of privilege—an assault most dramatically exemplified in the restructuring of the educational system. After dismal experience with the first products of a quasi-liberated secondary school system at the Mozambique Institute in Dar es Salaam, the new school at Bagamoyo (in Tanzania) has provided an entirely different (and extremely impressive) model, as fundamentally work- and military-oriented as it is academic, with a selection and promotion system stressing both political and more formal criteria. The Bagamoyo school is in any case merely the further extension of a progressive primary school system which is mushrooming in the liberated areas. This system is quite specifically designed to fend off alienation and to turn skills to the service of the community; it is every bit as impressive as the Bagamoyo experiment (if equally constrained by lack of funds and equipment). In addition, what can only be described as a people's health system—again in sharp contrast to the standard post-colonial pattern of Africa—is being generated in these same liberated areas.

Other possible gaps between "leadership" and mass which arise in the economic sphere have also begun to be quite self-consciously preempted, the solution being collective economic structures like a cooperative-based, "state trading" network, and even the beginnings of some cooperative productive activities at the village level (e.g., the "FRELIMO fields"). Finally, and fundamentally, the institutionalization of structures of participation and genuine self-assertion by the mass of the population has proceeded apace, at the levels of the *cercle*, the locality, the district, and the province—this too in the interests of consolidating a people's struggle. Such developments are crucial to the effectiveness of the drive for liberation, of course, but it is worth noting that they have important implications as well for the kind of Mozambique which is emerging ineluctably from such a struggle.

Such a protracted struggle has an important educative impact as regards the international posture of a new Mozambique, and of the new Mozambicans. As the confrontation continues, the leadership as well as the mass of the population have had that much greater opportunity to become aware of the

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complicated network of imperialist forces which lock Portuguese hegemony into place; it is no accident that Museveni and others have found many peasants in Mozambique fully conversant with the intrigues of the NATO countries, for example.[5] Similarly, when arms and military advice, as well as other kinds of aid, are seen to come primarily from the socialist countries—and from those few progressive forces in the advanced capitalist countries that are committed to Southern African liberation—further stimulus is given to the crystallization of an anti-imperialist ideology in Mozambique. Indeed, it is on the ideological plane that one can see many of the advances we have discussed being registered. For the ideology of the progressive members of the petty bourgeoisie who have come to dominate FRELIMO is not merely anti-imperialist; in fact, it is, at least implicitly, increasingly socialist. Unlike their more conservative counterparts, such leaders have begun to cut through to the realities of exploitation per se in their formulations, and this awareness is also communicated to the people. Here, at the level of consciousness, is emerging a final guarantee that in Mozambique the nationalist struggle will be carried through to its "logical" conclusion.

These, then, are the terms of progress in Mozambique which have been witnessed and confirmed by a number of close observers of Mozambican realities. Obviously, further first-hand observation of the life of the liberated areas would make for an even more convincing analysis, but this is not something which, under the circumstances, can be easily realized. Fortunately, however, we need not leave the matter here, for there is a range of additional evidence which is much more immediately accessible. I refer to the most visible aspects of Mozambican politics as they have publicly revealed themselves. If one looks carefully at the tensions within FRELIMO itself in recent years, one can see clearly documented the record of a sea change in the nature of the Mozambican struggle. These tensions are most readily explained in terms of the underlying pattern which we have been tracing, and, at the same time, they confirm that such a dramatic shift from conventional nationalism to revolutionary nationalism has in fact been taking place.

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The Politics of FRELIMO

It will now be apparent that the relationship between the objective imperatives defined by the waging of a successful liberation struggle and the political movement which comes to give institutional form to that struggle is a dialectical one of some complexity. As has happened in Zimbabwe, most members of the petty bourgeoisie can fail to make the leap from nationalist to revolutionary politics and in consequence the struggle is momentarily stalled, the dialectic is not set in motion.[6] Elsewhere, as in Mozambique, the logic of the struggle—of mass-line politics, social reconstruction, protracted warfare—imposes itself upon a growing number of the petty bourgeoisie, who feel no other choice is open to them but to commit "suicide as a class in order to be reborn as revolutionary workers, completely identified with the deepest aspirations of the people to which they belong."[7] Simultaneously, that group consolidates this advance organizationally and ideologically and is thus able to give further shape and direction to the positive forces unleashed by revolutionary struggle. Such a reciprocal process can then become a self-reinforcing one.

This advanced stage is not reached easily. For a movement like FRELIMO is, in reality, two entities for much of the early period of its existence: a conventional nationalist movement frustrated in achieving any easy transition to power, and a revolutionary movement struggling to be born. In the short run, this dichotomy finds concrete expression in a struggle within the petty bourgeoisie, increasingly pitting those who are and those who are not prepared to make the transition to revolutionary practice against one another. Of course, as the struggle develops, and in the longer run, the masses themselves come to an ever greater degree to be the arbiters of this conflict; this too is one of the "benefits" of the horrors of guerrilla warfare. We shall see that both of these latter aspects have been present in Mozambique and that the political patterns of Mozambique and of FRELIMO reflect them clearly.

Ironically, the seeds of the subsequent division within the nationalist forces were already present at the very moment of effective unity, the founding of FRELIMO in June 1962. The

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convention which brought together the then existing nationalist groupings—MANU, UDENAMO, UNAMI—was a reluctant marriage in many respects, in part the result of demands made by younger militants with more recent activist experience within Mozambique itself, in part of pressures from the Tanzanian government, host to several of these organizations. Indeed, it was the younger group which took the major initiative in drafting an initial and already quite progressive program for the new front in September 1962, "at the very moment when the established organizations were hesitating to place even their existing material possessions in a common pool for the benefit of the new movement." Small wonder that, as FRELIMO has recently admitted, "the causes which kept these organizations separate in the past—namely, tribalism, regionalism, lack of a clear and detailed set of goals and of agreed and relevant strategies—continued to exist" and that "the early days of FRELIMO were marred by mutual recriminations, expulsion, withdrawal, as between exile politicians who refused to give up the dead, futile in-fighting of an irrelevant brand of nationalist politics."[8]

Fortunately, the most obviously opportunist and irrelevant elements were the ones who split off, reconstituting in the process many of the organizations which had gone to make up FRELIMO, as well as several more. From this bewildering array of micro-parties there eventually emerged a second front, COREMO, based in Lusaka, which has been distinguished since its inception by its token membership and its almost total lack of activity. Not surprisingly, it has never been granted recognition as a meaningful liberation movement by the OAU Liberation Committee. On the other hand, FRELIMO, under the leadership of Eduardo Mondlane—a returned Mozambican academic of some distinction who was elected at the first congress as president, primarily with the support of the younger, more militant elements referred to above—managed to strengthen its position, as much as a result of the various defections which characterized the first few years as in spite of them. By September 1964, when its first military units crossed the Ruvuma from Tanzania, FRELIMO was ready to launch armed struggle;

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the socio-military process described in the preceding section was thus set in motion.

The least adaptable elements within the original nationalist coalition had been cast aside, but this did not by any means ensure clear sailing for FRELIMO. In fact, the struggle within the petty bourgeoisie merely became more subtle in the succeeding period as, from 1964 to 1969, a fresh wave of tension built up. As hinted earlier, one aspect of this centered on the question of education broadly conceived, and particularly on the role of the proto-elite within the institutions of a free Mozambique. Confrontation with overseas graduates arose early and led, among other things, to the movement's instructing certain sources of American-based scholarships to cut off support for Mozambicans who were proceeding to second and third degrees; it was hoped in this way to force skilled nationals back into the struggle, after mere persuasion had failed. Such exemplary initiatives were not particularly successful, but it is the fact of these and other initiatives having been launched which helps account for the (quite unrepresentative) hostility of many elitist Mozambicans in the United States toward the FRELIMO leadership. However, the most important arenas of confrontation, as also noted earlier, were closer to home—and particularly at the Mozambique Institute, FRELIMO's center for post-primary education.

A key actor in this particular drama was a Mozambican Roman Catholic priest, Father Gwenjere. Many people now believe him to have been an agent provocateur acting on behalf of the Portuguese, and certainly he came to nationalism rather precipitately after an orthodox early career inside Mozambique itself. What is more clear is that, from mid-1967 when he left the territory and linked his fortunes to FRELIMO in Dar es Salaam, he inflamed elitist sentiments, particularly within the Mozambique Institute, encouraging students to expect scholarships for further studies and quite specifically advising that they resist the 1966 decision of FRELIMO's Central Committee that all such students spend at least a year inside Mozambique actively participating in the struggle after completing secondary school. To this was added the demand that the medium of instruction be English, not Portuguese (English being, in effect, the language of scholarships!) and, manipulated equally dema-

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gogically, the demand that certain progressive white teachers at the Institute be fired. This conflict escalated to the point of forcing temporary closure of the school. However, it also brought the censure of Gwenjere by FRELIMO in March 1968, and his eventual removal from the movement (though not before he had stirred up members of the long-standing community of non-FRELIMO Mozambicans in Dar es Salaam to stage a raid on the office of FRELIMO during which a Central Committee member was killed). Even more importantly, perhaps, these events stimulated an intensification of those efforts, referred to in the preceding section, to restructure the education system of the new Mozambique. Meanwhile the political reverberations of these incidents continued to be felt within the movement well into the following year.

A second arena of tension developed during this period which also involved the broadest kinds of structural implications, though it too centered most graphically around the person of a single man, Mzee Lazaro Kavandame. Kavandame had been an active leader among the Makonde of Cabo Delgado Province (in MANU and in the cooperative movement) for many years, and soon became the most prominent of FRELIMO politicians with a base in the area (being, for a period, the Secretary of the Province and a member of the Central Committee). But the limitations of his particular kind of leadership soon revealed themselves: such leadership was self-serving economically, divisive politically, incoherent militarily,[9] reflecting, in short, a style and substance very much after the fashion exemplified by regional political "barons" in a country like Kenya. Most negatively, he sought to turn the new commercial structures of the liberated areas to his own use, skimming off large surpluses for himself and his immediate supporters. As he came under increasing pressure from FRELIMO leaders and from more committed militants within his own area, he quite predictably began to play the tribal card, seeking to crystallize "Makonde consciousness" around his own person. He also actively sought support for his intrigues among certain of the less progressive but strategically placed elements in the Tanzanian leadership. By 1968 he was even prepared to make an (abortive) bid for separatist independence for his province, to actively

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sabotage FRELIMO's military efforts,[10] and, when finally balked and expelled from the movement in early 1969, to go over to the Portuguese and make public pronouncements on their behalf. It is important to note that long before this latter move it was perfectly clear that Kavandame had forfeited any claim to enjoying popular support, even among his own tribesmen. Just as the logic of the struggle had transcended Gwenjere and his elitism, so too it was moving beyond the familiar politico-economic royalism and Africanized exploitation of such men as Kavandame.

By 1969 the existence of two different "lines," as FRELIMO periodicals came increasingly to refer to the elements of contestation within the movement, was readily apparent. But the final scenes of this particular phase of the Mozambican drama were not to be acted out until after the assassination of Mondlane in February 1969. It is impossible to say what the pattern of FRELIMO's development might have been, had that assassination by an unknown hand not occurred—probably much the same, with minor variations. What is clear, however, is that Mondlane's role had been crucial to *guaranteeing* the kind of shift within FRELIMO and within liberated Mozambique which was taking place during his presidency. If Gwenjere, Kavandame, and (as we shall see shortly) Vice-President Uria Simango represented a wholly petty bourgeois nationalism, and if a handful of others represented a quite developed revolutionary position from a very early date, then Mondlane stood closer to the center of the FRELIMO political spectrum. And, so situated, he came to epitomize those absolutely crucial members of the Mozambican petty bourgeoisie who were prepared to accept more and more of "the logic of protracted struggle," to contemplate "committing suicide" in the interest of a revolutionary politics.

Thus it was impossible to talk with Mondlane, or to hear him speak over the years, without observing the growth of his own understanding and practice. Some observers have insisted, nonetheless, that aspects of his accustomed life style and political approach would have imposed a severe limitation upon how far he could have continued to move in this direction. Again, it is

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unnecessary to speculate about such matters. The fact remains that by using his powerful presence within the movement to guarantee the necessary minimum of organizational unity, while also swimming with the tide of revolutionary nationalism and accepting more and more its logic, he did preside over the build-up of the prerequisites for further progress. By the time of his death the struggle was sufficiently advanced to have shifted the center of political gravity to within the territory. The Second Congress—held, significantly, inside the liberated areas in 1968—had already moved to increase markedly the presence in the Central Committee of direct representatives from the political and military institutions of the interior. The new mass basis of Mozambican politics was beginning, strikingly, to assert itself. Similarly, a cadre of revolutionary petty bourgeois—adapting, like Mondlane, and often even less equivocally, to the new imperatives—had by then emerged within the political and military spheres and could hope to consolidate its hold on the leadership positions. In fact, Samora Machel, who was to become president in 1970, can be seen as being fully representative of this group. When the showdown came inside FRELIMO, as it inevitably had to after the cancelling out of Mondlane's dominant role, it was these popular and progressive forces which were able to carry the day.

The result did not take place without a struggle, a struggle which racked FRELIMO in 1969. For the "tendency" toward conservative, petty bourgeois nationalism ran right through the movement and very far up the apparatus. Indeed, it became increasingly clear that this tendency found its ultimate focus in no less important a personage than Reverend Uria Simango, the vice-president of FRELIMO under Mondlane. Simango, a powerful figure within FRELIMO from the outset (he was Mondlane's closest rival for the presidency in the earliest days, for example) staked out a position which consistently tilted in that direction, tending to reduce the complex nature of the struggle to its most baldly racial dimensions and the question of military tactics to its most adventurist (and self-defeating) formulae. Not surprisingly, it also began to be apparent in the last few years before Mondlane's death that Simango was giving

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tacit support to the deviations represented by both Gwenjere and Kavandame, despite his having taken an active hand in the Central Committee decisions which expelled them both; indeed, his involvement with Mozambique Institute students appears to have been particularly overt and was in any case only one of many indications of his identification with such elitist pretensions. Still other aspects of the syndrome of conventional nationalism were to characterize his position in a quite predictable manner—notably the use of ethnic and regional counters as a means of consolidating his power base. In this case Simango tried to light the spark by setting his fellow "northerners" against the specter of "southern dominance."

Enough of this was clear by 1969 for spokesmen of the progressive tendency to move to block Simango's "automatic" ascendance to the presidency in the wake of Mondlane's assassination. When the Central Committee did meet in April 1969, the ground rules of post-Mondlane politics were staked out by means of a fierce and effective attack on the many conservative elements which continued to be prominent within the organization (Nungu, for example); not coincidentally, a number of such men were known to be close associates of Simango. In such an atmosphere it was also possible to organize the succession in a manner more favorable to the progressive group: a Presidential Council—consisting of Simango, Marcellino dos Santos (a man of the Left within FRELIMO for a long time), and Samora Machel, the head of the army—was formed. In this way certain formalities were observed; FRELIMO statements could even conclude at the time that

> almost from the very beginning of FRELIMO there had been comrades with . . . erroneous conceptions. Some of them had deserted in the course of the Revolution. . . . Gradually, therefore, it was seen that "the Revolution itself ensures the rejection of the impure load it carries." But other elements remained among us carrying their mistaken ideas. It was on the latter that the last meeting of the Central Committee had a decisive influence, bringing them back again to the revolutionary path. This action was the work of a group of comrades who had always kept themselves faithful to the interests of the masses, respecting collective values and fighting individualism and personal ambition that foment

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opportunism, comrades linked with the concrete reality and immersed in the realization of the principal tasks of the struggle.[11]

Yet, as very soon became apparent, what really happened was that "in that meeting we finally identified the existence of two ideological lines": "After this, the division became more acute. A struggle began between the groups representing the two lines. And all the problems, all the difficulties we have had since then are the result of this division."[12] The stage had merely been set for the final act of the struggle for succession between these two tendencies.

As noted earlier, however, the die had already been cast. Samora, after all, represented the army, a powerful base in its own right, but all the more so when one considered that this was an army with an ever increasing number of the attributes of a people's military force and one rooted in a vital political process now established *within* Mozambique itself. Thus it was no accident that when Kavandame held back the "Cabo Delgado delegation," representative of his own clique, to the FRELIMO Conference of 1969, Cabo Delgado was effectively represented by military delegates from that province; no accident, either, that it was the "military," and not Kavandame, who could claim the effective allegiance of the people in Cabo Delgado, as events were to prove very soon thereafter. We have also observed the way in which the Central Committee, after the conference, reflected these new facts of political life in its composition. Simango himself must have realized that time was running out, that the days of exile politics and exile politicians, of non-revolutionary nationalism and simple racialist pieties, were drawing to a close. He chose to stake all on one last, desperate gamble: the publication of his document "Gloomy Situation in FRELIMO."[13]

This text, a *locus classicus* for students of the disintegration of conventional African nationalism in the context of truly revolutionary conditions, made entirely clear what could only be suspected prior to its circulation. In addition to many shrill and reckless accusations of murder and assassination made against the "Samora group," Simango's document publicly revealed the latter's close identification with each of those reactionary

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aspects of Mozambican nationalism against which the more progressive tendency of the leadership had set itself. The mobilization of tribal sentiment for factional advantage is one aspect of this. Simango's document several times manages to identify his opponents—albeit misleadingly—as "southerners": "Since 1966 there has been a tendency of a group, unfortunately composed of people from the south which included the late president of FRELIMO, to meet and take decisions by themselves and impose them on the people through maneuver." Similarly, the attack on Janet Mondlane, which is also premised on a totally false picture of the degree of autonomy the Mozambique Institute has had from Central Committee scrutiny, comes across clearly as an attempt to substitute emotive and racial arguments for substantive arguments concerning policy.

Equally significant are Simango's expressions of solidarity with elements which were, by the time of his document's publication, wholly discredited. Now for Simango, "the participation of Father Gwenjere in the Mozambique Institute problem and in other affairs of FRELIMO was an expression of sympathy and solidarity with his own people." Yet Simango had participated fully and without dissent in the decision to expel Gwenjere from FRELIMO. Exactly the same was true for the case of Kavandame, but in his document Simango's picture of the Cabo Delgado situation is a blurred one, and Kavandame emerges as much sinned against as sinning. Needless to say, nothing is noted in his analysis about the economic aggrandizement and exploitation indulged in by the Kavandame group, though that had been the heart of the issue. In a parallel manner, other sections of the document seem quite specifically designed to flatter the elitist pretensions of the Mozambican student group in Tanzania and abroad. Moreover, immediately after his subsequent expulsion from FRELIMO in December 1969, Simango wrote to Mozambican students in the United States assuring them that in any movement of his own which was subsequently established, their accomplishments would be scrupulously recognized. As noted above, FRELIMO responsibles had suspected at the time that Simango was more linked with the initiatives of Gwenjere and Kavandame than he had cared to state openly; now his declining fortunes had forced him to

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reveal his hand in an open bid for what remained of their constituencies.

Predictably, this package was cemented ideologically by means of the disarming rejection of the necessity for any ideological clarification!

> There is a swing to say that we are divided on ideology. This can only mean differences on economic, religious, social policies (class), etc. I agree that ideology is very important but it should never be considered as a uniting or dividing factor of the nationalist liberation force at this stage, if all agree and accept fundamental principles: (a) liberate Mozambique from the Portuguese colonial domination and (b) through the armed struggle.

Of course, many others who have continued to play an active role in the FRELIMO leadership would agree, up to a point, with this sentiment—agree that it is premature to speak overtly and aggressively about the tasks of "socialist construction," agree that a broad-based national liberation front characterizes the essential nature of the movement at the present time. But in Simango's case such sentiments have to be interpreted in the light of the particular kind of faction he was attempting to put together and of the particular kinds of quasi-class interests he was objectively representing. Only then can this kind of "negative ideology" be understood for what it is in practice: a shield for the sorts of "internal" exploitation, inimical to the further development of the struggle, which we have been describing.

It also represented an appeal to a particular kind of external constituency—in Tanzania, and in Africa in general—whose support Simango now sought. There were elements within the Tanzanian leadership, for example, which could be attracted by this brand of "anti-ideological" (and effectively self-serving) black nationalism; indeed, such men had actually attempted to facilitate the strengthening of this sort of tendency within FRELIMO in the immediate preceding period. Simango may have hoped that similar elements, themselves more strongly entrenched in African countries other than Tanzania, would rally to the support of this kind of line. But Tanzania was the key, and there such leaders were being themselves outflanked by the development of Tanzania's own brand of socialism; with the

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issue already settled in that country, at least for the time being, Nyerere could make clear his unambiguous preference for the more progressive wing of FRELIMO. Moreover, the essential opportunism of Simango's own shifts of position soon became graphically apparent. By the time of his issuing a second, even more desperate, document at a meeting of the OAU Liberation Committee only a few months later, Simango's description of the "gloomy situation" in FRELIMO had been turned more or less upside down. Whereas before it had been the Samora/dos Santos group which had been prematurely introducing "the question of scientific socialism and capitalism in Mozambique" ("Gloomy Situation in FRELIMO," p. 4), now the same group stood accused of the opposite vice: "Talks about replacement of people and necessity *to purge the organization of Communist elements were frequent.* Precisely it is these people the propaganda was directed against who have been removed in one way or another."[14] One could only speculate that Simango, having failed in Tanzania with his black nationalist ploy, was now laying the basis for a possible (though equally unsuccessful) "ultra-left" appeal to Chinese sources of aid.

For Simango, effectively blocked within FRELIMO by the strength of the organization and the new reality of its popular character, and deprived as well of any Tanzanian support, had in mind the launching of a new movement. Suspended from FRELIMO (November 1969), he tried to mount just such an alternative. This in turn was the last straw for the Tanzanian authorities, and in February 1970 he was ordered from the country. He drifted to Cairo, with occasional forays into Zambia and the United States, and before long, like others before him who could not keep pace with the Mozambican revolution, he had entered COREMO. From that resting place his ineffective sniping action has continued.

The volte-face of some of his closest confidants is even more striking. Murupa, an erstwhile Central Committee member, went over to the Portuguese side not long afterward, becoming in time a senior official in the colonial apparatus, with responsibility for implementing the strategic hamlet program. To give him his due, Simango has to date publicly resisted Portuguese blandishments designed to lure him to their side. But the links which continue

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to exist between him and Murupa, for example, remain unknown and, in any case, the objective result of his apostasy can only be to strengthen the ability of the Portuguese to confuse the issue at stake in Mozambique.

Fortunately, the creation of such a possibility is not the most important result of the series of events we have been tracing. More significant is the fact that this process has, on balance, helped to *strengthen* the movement. Indeed, FRELIMO's own conclusion seems to be substantially accurate:

> The spirit which prevailed at the latest meeting of the Central Committee revealed that we have already reached an advanced phase in that process of purifying our ranks. Frankness reigned—there was friendship and revolutionary fraternity among all members. The climate that we felt was the result of the ideological unity that existed among us. For the first time in the history of FRELIMO, there were no discordant voices on the Central Committee which were opposed to the revolutionary positions; it constituted a solid and united block.
>
> We consider that a great victory has been achieved, one that must be preserved and defended at all costs. The Central Committee itself recommended continuous vigilance; in order that that vigilance may be efficiently exercised, the Central Committee clarified certain concepts. Thus, the Central Committee stressed its definition of the enemy. The enemy has two faces: the principal and direct enemy, i.e., Portuguese colonialism and imperialism, which are open enemies we confront daily on the battlefield, and in relation to whom no doubt or confusion is possible. The other face is that of the indirect or secondary enemy, who presents himself under the cover of a nationalist and even a revolutionary, thus making it difficult to identify him. The Central Committee reaffirmed that the characterization of the enemy for us will never be derived from color, nationality, race, or religion. On the other hand, our enemy is that one who exploits or creates conditions for the exploitation of our people, whatever his color, race, nationality, or religion.
>
> Within the same intention of providing ideological weapons to our comrades so that they may be able to better defend our revolution, the Central Committee defined the qualities which every FRELIMO militant must build or develop in himself: continuously fighting ambition, opportunism, tribalism, and corruption. The existence of a high level of these qualities will be the condition for a militant to be appointed for positions of responsibility in our organization. . . .
>
> Thus, a new period is being opened in the life of FRELIMO.

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We took an important step forward in the consolidation of our unity, we elected a truly revolutionary leadership, we clarified our political line, we came nearer our final victory.[15]

It may be that some potential contradictions remain beneath the surface. The terms of the emerging ideology are still left somewhat undefined. "Exploitation" and "imperialism" characteristically join "Portuguese colonialism" and "ambition, opportunism, tribalism, and corruption" in the list of FRELIMO's enemies, but any public hint that the movement has "socialist" intentions is systematically avoided. It is therefore possible that there remains ground for tension within FRELIMO ranks between the varying claims of "socialism" and "nationalism" (albeit "revolutionary nationalism") at some subsequent stage of development, and particularly in the post-independence period. But even if this possibility exists, it is, for the time being, a fairly remote one. Moreover, all our evidence suggests that the trend of events may work, in the future as in the past, to resolve this potential contradiction and to fuse the meaning of socialism and revolutionary nationalism in Mozambique. For FRELIMO's *practice* continues to be an increasingly progressive one. And with the most overt sources of tension within the movement removed, the cadres who remain are primarily those who can be expected to move still further with the logic of protracted struggle. Mozambican advances since 1969—both in military terms and in terms of national reconstruction—would seem to bear out this supposition in impressive fashion.

Prospects

It can be concluded that the triumph of this line within FRELIMO both reflects the emergence of a popular base and a progressive infrastructure for the Mozambican liberation struggle *and* gives promise of further mobilizing and consolidating these crucial features. The positive impact of these developments upon the military struggle can scarcely be overemphasized. Experience elsewhere suggests that liberated areas of the sort which are being firmed up politically and economically in northern Mozambique are the *sine qua non* of further advance. It is significant that in both 1970 and 1971 the Portuguese launched what were heralded in advance as final mop-up campaigns in

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Cabo Delgado and Niassa provinces, throwing vast numbers of soldiers and much matériel into the fray. On both occasions they were forced to draw back beyond the Zambezi in disarray, leaving only the few fortified posts which they already held and a population largely undismayed by the outbursts of Portuguese terrorism and intimidation witnessed during the offensives. A local population increasingly conscious, organized, and self-reliant also frees many more full-time militants for further advance; the dramatic successes during the past two years in Tete, where guerrillas have pushed south of the Zambezi and into the vicinity of the Cabora Bassa dam, are testimony to the accomplishments which lie behind. Moreover, such successes tend to have a snowball effect. Certainly, progressive forces in the world at large have come to recognize the vigor and commitment of FRELIMO's efforts ever more decisively. Thus the Chinese, somewhat loath in the past to commit themselves to movements which already enjoy Soviet and Eastern European assistance, have continued to intensify their support for FRELIMO and their overt manifestations of solidarity. Even liberal forces in the advanced capitalist world (e.g., the World Council of Churches, the governments of the Scandinavian countries) have had to come to terms with the reality of FRELIMO advances and begin to examine critically their previous indifference to, or even tacit support of, Portuguese colonialism.

Equally important, these developments in liberated Mozambique have slowly but surely begun to foreclose the possibility of a false decolonization among lines hitherto quite predictable in much of Africa. Nothing can be said with certainty in this respect, of course, but there can be little doubt that the process of continually weeding out from the leadership the least progressive of the petty bourgeoisie has done a great deal to ensure the continuity of the social revolution already in train in the liberated areas. Moreover, we have noted the extent to which the army, a threat to revolutionary decolonization even under conditions which seem quite promising, has also been linked with popular aspirations and activities in ways that differ markedly from the situation in Algeria, for example. Finally, to the (considerable) extent that the mass of the peasantry is be-

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coming an organized and active ingredient in the decolonization equation under Mozambican conditions, this too is a surety of continuity; Museveni's findings as to the growing peasant understanding of the nature of imperialism and the increasingly progressive character of their identification with the Mozambican nation suggest attributes of consciousness that are not likely to be easily shed in the aftermath of colonialism.

Of course, there are vast stretches of Mozambique which have not been directly touched by the full logic of the liberated areas, including so large an urban conglomerate as Lourenço Marques, which is the home of a significant proletariat *and* of a potentially conservative African bureaucratic group whose fortunes have heretofore been linked to the Portuguese but whose skills may have to be accommodated, albeit with great caution, within an independent Mozambique. The timing and the terms of the full integration of such parts of the country into the Mozambican revolution will have their influence on the shape of the post-colonial nation. At the same time, it is apparent that FRELIMO is quite active clandestinely far beyond the front lines of its own military advance, and the promise of the liberated areas is already well known and increasingly well understood in most parts of the country. The time is long past, if it ever existed, when any safe and manageable "neocolonial solution" was a serious option for the Portuguese. The Portuguese, for very good reasons of their own,[16] eschewed it at the earliest stages, and now FRELIMO, as we have seen, has long since outgrown it. But there are tame Mozambicans; some of them, like Kavandame and Murupa, have already been on display. Simango's brand of nationalism may eventually make him easy prey for slightly more subtle blandishments; then COREMO, or some other structure altogether, could become the vehicle for a fast, desperate, preemptive move by imperialism, as the Portuguese falter even more dramatically. FRELIMO would not be fooled by any such elevation of a Mozambican Hastings Banda to formal authority; in all likelihood the movement would go on fighting. What the response of African states, even the most committed of them, would be to this kind of "victory" for African nationalism is more problematic. Certainly supporters of Mozambican nationalism would be wise to inform

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themselves of what is really at stake well in advance of such an eventuality.

Yet it must be emphasized that even this is not the most probable path of the continuing struggle in Mozambique; in fact, an even more desperate, much less equivocal, confrontation seems to be in the cards. As noted, the time may well be past when any very straightforward brand of "neocolonialism" is a live option there. Moreover, the response to the conflict inside Mozambique on the part of racist and imperialist powers which lie beyond the territory's borders seems increasingly less likely to be such a measured one. The possible contagion of Mozambican (as well as Angolan) military success is sufficiently threatening to South Africa and Rhodesia to have already forced such actors to intervene more menacingly: South African troops have been at the ready around the Cabora Bassa dam site for months, and Rhodesian soldiers and airplanes have been very active militarily in Tete Province, south of the Zambezi; the police and military commanders of the three white redoubts exchanged regular visits most recently, and South African mercenaries (with at least tacit South African government connivance) were identified as carrying out defoliation missions over the fields of northern Mozambique.[17] This trend is bound to continue. Nor has the existence of this broader threat to the whole of Southern Africa been overlooked by the forces of international capitalism, who have noted with alarm the intensification of FRELIMO's revolutionary and anti-imperialist line (in itself vital to the movement's military success, as we have seen).[18] The hardening American position, first under Johnson and later under Nixon, which culminated in the Azores Agreement of 1971,[19] has no doubt been partly a response to the specter of a future, FRELIMO-ruled, militant Mozambique (a Mozambique which gets some support, need one add, from the "Communists"!). Thus the increasingly successful Mozambican revolution is one of the chief sparks which is lighting the fuse for all of Southern Africa; in all probability, therefore, the struggle will be less easily compartmentalized along territorial lines in the future than it has been in the past. This fact does not make the liberation of Mozambique any less important in itself, of course, but it does widen the field of relevant con-

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siderations for both Mozambican revolutionaries and for their supporters abroad.

Implications for Metropolitan Radicals

This pattern of development in Mozambique has implications for the practice of progressives in the advanced capitalist countries. Since Southern Africa could become, from the mid-seventies, the sort of crucial zone of confrontation that Southeast Asia has been since the mid-sixties, it is well to state these precisely, albeit too briefly, here.

(1) Take, first, the case of the liberal sympathizer. We have seen the extent to which the Mozambican liberation struggle has given rise to a social revolution and an anti-imperialist movement. In Africa this is the logic of genuine liberation. Yet if one reads between the lines of many liberal treatises on South Africa, this is precisely the denouement that most liberals seek to avoid; too often they advise, say, American support for liberation before "extremists" profit from a "deteriorating" situation.[20] Of course, most such spokesmen are in any case mere apologists for the corporate structure, but the most sincere (if confused) of them must be encouraged to face squarely the necessity of backing socialist and revolutionary solutions to liberation struggles. It seems inevitable that, as the Southern African situation escalates, FRELIMO will find its aims and its accomplishments distorted in the Western press; a firm understanding of the realities of the anti-imperialist struggle may be some inoculation against any attendant hysteria. Liberals may also draw their own brand of solace from the fact that FRELIMO is not so "aligned" as the NLF/PRG in South Vietnam and that it sternly safeguards its independence from foreign ideology and foreign influence of any sort. But in important respects the Vietnamese and Mozambican situations are similar. Left-liberals —of all colors—who seek some (nonexistent) middle ground in Mozambique (as in Vietnam) will be objectively lending their support to the worst barbarisms of imperialism.

(2) A closely related point should also be considered by those most sympathetic toward *nationalist* aspirations in contemporary Africa. Here one thinks most immediately of black nationalists in the metropoles who are, inevitably, deeply con-

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cerned with the Southern African situation: it is clear, for example, that in the United States the black community is becoming an increasingly vital force pressing for progressive solutions in Southern Africa, one whose views and likely reactions must be taken into careful account in the strategic and tactical calculations of wielders of state and corporate power. But the relevance of the cautionary note which must be sounded here is by no means confined to black groups. All those who commit themselves to the cause of African nationalism will have to make subtle discriminations in the course of the coming struggle, discriminations for which the analytical tools made available by a nationalist perspective pure and simple will not prove fully adequate.

It is true that a preemptive "neocolonial solution" may not be the most likely outcome of this phase of the Mozambican revolution, but it is not beyond the realm of possibility. If this should happen, it would be tragic if many uncritical militants in the metropolitan countries were to be caught with a Mozambican General Thieu (or even another Hastings Banda) on their hands and on their consciences. At the very least it can be safely predicted that the diverse brands of nationalism in Mozambique are to be played off against one another by the Portuguese and their mentors in order to maximize confusion in the advanced capitalist centers. Careful scrutiny of the claims of movements will therefore be necessary, as well as an awareness that under African conditions the most black-sounding of nationalisms can become the most easily co-opted and the least serviceable to the mass of the African population. Not all nationalisms are equivalent; it is the revolutionary nationalism of a movement like FRELIMO which guarantees that "real freedom" to which Nyerere was referring at the outset of this paper.

(3) However, as we have seen, the importance of these latter considerations should not at present be exaggerated. Even were the Portuguese to become so inclined, they could not conjure away the fact that FRELIMO already has many more than 10,000 men under arms, is in effective control of vast tracts of territory, and is moving forward. Nor in the foreseeable future could imperialism really hope to breathe effective

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life into any shadowy, African-based, hypothetical alternative to FRELIMO. Thus there is no need for any confusion as to where the responsibility of international socialists of all colors lies.

The matter cannot be allowed merely to rest with this bland affirmation, however. The fact remains that the struggle in Mozambique must be granted a much higher priority by metropolitan activists than it has been heretofore. As noted, the Southern African white regimes and many of their allies are aware that tension is beginning to escalate markedly within their gates; they will undoubtedly continue to act firmly and brutally. At the same time, the Left's response has been as yet scarcely an adequate one, in spite of the fact that revolutionary advances in Portuguese Africa are the major force which is placing the whole ugly question of Southern Africa ever more firmly on the historical agenda. Valuable time was lost in Vietnam—five or ten years at least—because the Left failed to take seriously what was happening there. The same thing must not be allowed to happen in Southern Africa in general, or in Mozambique in particular. To be sure, some progressive elements in the West are already engaged in concrete manifestations of solidarity. But it is imperative that many more international socialists treat this struggle with the seriousness it deserves.

Postscript, September 1972

Shortly after completing the preceding essay (in mid-1972) I was invited by FRELIMO to accompany a column of combatants on a march into the liberated areas of Tete Province. I was thus afforded the opportunity to spend sixteen days during the latter part of August 1972 observing at first hand some of the events and structures which I had been able to investigate up to then only from a distance. I hope to recount this experience at greater length elsewhere, but it seems relevant to note here that the evidence I was able to collect inside Mozambique bore out, even more fully than I had anticipated, the argument advanced in this paper. In addition, the recent announcement that in September FRELIMO opened up military activities in Manica and Sofala Provinces is further dramatic proof of continued FRELIMO success *and* of the continued escalation of the confrontation—with all the implications to which I have referred.

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NOTES

1. For a relevant perspective on continental developments, see chapters 1 and 2 of the forthcoming volume cited in the footnote on p. 22 above.
2. J. K. Nyerere, "Introduction," pp. 26-32 (section subtitled "The Problems of Building Socialism in an Ex-Colonial Country"), in *Freedom and Socialism* (London, New York, Nairobi, 1968); emphasis added. See also Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York, 1966).
3. See chapter 6 of Arrighi and Saul, *op. cit.*
4. See, for example, Y. Museveni, "Fanon's Theory of Violence: Its Verification in Liberated Mozambique," in N. Shamuyarira, ed., *Essays on the Liberation of Southern Africa* (Dar es Salaam, 1971), and the series of articles by F. Ruhinda entitled "My Long March," which appeared in *The Nationalist* (Dar es Salaam) in six installments between June 14 and June 25, 1971. It has been estimated that already well over a million Mozambicans live within the framework of FRELIMO-sponsored institutions, and that the liberation forces control from one quarter to one third of the land area, including most of the three northern provinces, Cabo Delgado, Niassa, and Tete.
5. Y. Museveni, *op. cit.*
6. Of course, there are other variables, logistical ones in particular, which affect the differential pace of development of the struggle as between territories in Southern Africa.
7. Amilcar Cabral, "The Weapon of Theory," in his *Revolution in Guinea* (New York, 1971), p. 110; see also his "Brief Analysis of the Social Structure in Guinea" in the same volume.
8. Editorial, "25th of June—The Starting Point," *Mozambique Revolution* (Dar es Salaam), no. 51 (April-June 1972).
9. Nor is it accidental that in the military sphere Kavandame was one of those attracted to the most adventurist of lines, arguing (prematurely) for such strategies as the direct assault on large towns (e.g., Beira).
10. Among other things, he appears to have been very directly involved in the assassination of the FRELIMO military commander, Kankhomba, on the Tanzanian border in late 1968.
11. Editorial, *Mozambique Revolution,* no. 38 (March-April 1969).
12. Editorial, *Mozambique Revolution,* no. 41 (October-December 1969).
13. Uria T. Simango, "Gloomy Situation in FRELIMO" (mimeographed, n.d.). The quotations which follow in the text are taken from this document.
14. Uria T. Simango, "The Reason Why I Issued a Document on the Situation in FRELIMO" (mimeographed, n.d.); emphasis added.
15. Editorial, *Mozambique Revolution,* no. 43 (April-June 1970). By the time of the Central Committee meeting described in this editorial (May 1970), the expedient of establishing a presidential triumvirate in the preceding year had served its purpose; now Samora Machel was elected president of FRELIMO in his own right, and Marcellino dos Santos became vice-president.
16. This point, among others, is discussed in chapter 2 of Arrighi and Saul, *op. cit.*

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17. See Cal McCrystal, "Portugal Wages Chemical War to Starve Rebels," *The Sunday Times* (London), July 9, 1972.
18. Of course, from the early 1960s Portugal reversed its long-standing policy of fending off non-Portuguese investments in the colonies precisely with an eye to guaranteeing this kind of long-term support.
19. See Africa Research Group, "Le Pacte des Açores: des dollars contre les Africains," in *Africasia* (Paris), February 7, 1972.
20. Cf. Waldemar Nielsen, *The Great Powers and Africa* (New York 1969); for a critique, see Africa Research Group, "Southern Africa," in the *Guardian* (New York), April 18, 1970.

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ON DISCOVERING MARXISM

BY PAUL M. SWEEZY

On January 20, 1973, the *Harvard Crimson* celebrated its 100th anniversary with a dinner in Boston attended by present and former editors. Since my four undergraduate years were devoted rather more to the *Crimson* than to academic studies, I was gratified to be invited by the present board of editors to be one of a group of former editors, each representing one of the last six decades, to speak briefly at the dinner. I did so with my conscience weighed down by recognition that January 20th was also Inauguration Day and that I should perhaps have been in Washington rather than in Boston. Several people who were present on the occasion asked for a copy of my remarks. I promised, subject to the approval of my colleagues, to publish the text in MR. Here it is. As a matter of interest I should add that the chairman of the meeting, the current *Crimson* president, took up the suggestion that a resolution along the lines proposed in the third paragraph should be sent to Nixon. The resolution was adopted by acclamation.—P.M.S.

To judge from what my predecessors on the platform have said, I am about to strike a discordant note. But as far as Harvard is concerned, I have been doing that for a long time. So I assume that when I was invited to speak here tonight it was with the expectation that I would continue to do so. You have been forewarned.

In a way it is a pleasure to be here for this observation of the 100th anniversary. It is good to see old friends, many after more years than I like to think of; and it is good to make new friends, especially among the younger people.

But for me at any rate the pleasure is strongly tempered by other feelings. My conscience tells me that I ought to be in Washington, taking part with thousands of others in protesting what is perhaps the most shameful episode in American history

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and its fish-blooded perpetrator. God save us from four more years of this monster. (In this connection, I would hope that a distinguished gathering of this kind would see fit to send a resolution of protest to the White House demanding that the cease-fire agreement be signed immediately and that the United States strictly observe its terms in the future.) And while my conscience tells me that I ought to be in Washington, my heart is with the heroic Vietnamese people who are making world history before our eyes at a most terrible cost to themselves. That we all, here and abroad, are immeasurably in their debt will, I am convinced, become increasingly clear as the years go by.

What has happened in Vietnam is quite simply that the last and greatest of the capitalist empires has suffered a stunning defeat from which it can never fully recover. Things will never be the same again. The great majority of the human race living in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, who have been slaughtered, enslaved, and mercilessly exploited for some four centuries, now know that they can stand up to the mightiest technological and military power the world has ever seen. And increasing numbers of the American people who have traditionally accepted capitalism and imperialism and their accompanying mythology as part of the God-given order of nature are perceiving the truth that this whole system of exploitation and violence is anti-human, is unnecessary, has got to go. To employ one of the favorite clichés of the business and financial world, from now on it's going to be a whole new ball game, and my guess is that it is going to be more and more necessary to choose up sides, and harder and harder to remain a mere spectator.

My last year on the *Crimson* was 1931, and we were then on the eve of another turning point in history, one of the most somber of all times. The United States was already into the Great Depression; the Second World War was beginning in Manchuria; and the triumph of Nazism was only two years off. As I look back on it, the thing that strikes me most forcibly is the complete inability of my college generation to understand what was going on. Our experience didn't help, our college courses didn't help, we had no framework within which to develop our own interpretation. I'm pretty sure that if you were

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to examine the *Crimson* of those years you would find very little to contradict this view.

What happened in the next few years struck most of us, I think, as a series of unexpected and inexplicable disasters. I was luckier than most. I spent the year 1932-1933 at the London School of Economics which, in those days, was another world, full of life and strife, of intellectual ferment and political activism, totally different from anything I had known at Harvard. I was introduced to Marxism by my fellow students and by such teachers as Harold Laski, whom Harvard, true to form, had fired some dozen years earlier. I came to see—and it was by far the most important discovery of my life—that what had seemed inexplicable disasters were in fact the logical consequences of capitalism and imperialism.

I returned to Harvard after LSE as a graduate student and economics instructor, and I spent the next eight years expanding and deepening my understanding of Marxism and trying to introduce this revolutionary body of thought in a serious way into American intellectual and academic life. I like to think that I have had some modest successes in both endeavors.

Fortunately for me, however, this was not the kind of activity which, then or now, commended itself to the academic powers-that-be. So when the up-or-out time came (actually while I was in London with the OSS during World War II), I was duly ushered out. The Economics Department never did me a greater favor. After the war, and safely out of academia, I went into radical journalism, founding, along with the late Leo Huberman, MONTHLY REVIEW—with, I might add, the encouragement and generous financial support of one of the Harvard greats of that period, F. O. Matthiessen.

It was then and in the years since that I came to appreciate the invaluable training in writing and editing that four years devoted to the *Crimson* had given me, even in that time of innocence. Whatever contributions I have been able to make in MONTHLY REVIEW's near-quarter-century of existence—and I must say that they have been much more substantial abroad than at home—I owe in large part to the *Crimson*, and I am deeply and forever grateful. I hope there are many others who can say the same.

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AMERICAN POWER AND ITS FRUSTRATIONS

BY CHERYL PAYER

The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954, by Joyce and Gabriel Kolko. Harper & Row, 1972, 820 pp.; $15.00.

No one who is seriously interested in postwar history can afford to ignore this book. The Kolkos have aspired to write the most important work on postwar American foreign policy for the years they cover. If they have succeeded—and they have, in this reviewer's opinion, despite some serious flaws—it is not due to the questionable assets of size or depth of bibliography, but because the authors ask the important questions relating to their subject. Even if their answers are not all correct, they have enlarged the scope of the inquiry and forced their critics and successors to wrestle with problems that have previously been slighted or ignored.

The title is well chosen. The theme which ties together the wide-ranging contents of the book is the attempt by the United States, by far the most powerful nation to emerge from the Second World War, to mold the rest of the world to its liking, and the frustrations it encountered, both from the contradictions inherent in its own policies and from the resistance of nations and classes trying to exercise some control over their own destinies. A simple and obvious choice of theme, perhaps; but it avoids both extremes to which radical interpretations are susceptible: the myth

Cheryl Payer is writing a book on the relations of the International Monetary Fund with the Third World.

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of the omniscience and omnipotence of the evil American colossus, and the mirror myth of the omniscience and (ultimate) omnipotence of its revolutionary opponents.

The kind of world which the U.S. government wanted to reconstruct after the war, the Kolkos tell us, was that of a reformed and purified capitalism. This ideal system would resemble that which had existed before the war, without the trade and currency restrictions which had shut out U.S. exports during the Great Depression, and without the nasty tendencies toward fascism which had provoked a destructive war between the capitalist powers. The severely damaged industrial economies of Europe and Japan were to be reconstructed into good trading partners of the United States, and those which still retained colonial possessions or enjoyed the advantages of a restricted trading system such as the sterling bloc were to be maneuvered into dismantling the restrictions so that the Third World, too, would be open to U.S.-dominated trade.

The corollary of this thesis is that the USSR was not the major problem of postwar U.S. foreign policy. The United States was opposed to the Left, of course, but also to national capitalisms even of a conservative variety which would close their economies to easy American penetration. The Kolkos repeatedly emphasize that, even if the Soviet Union did not exist, the shape of the major problem of U.S. policy would be the same, since it was national and class aspirations which posed the fundamental challenge, not the machinations of the Cominform. The USSR, in fact, used its prestige and disciplinary powers to keep the European Communist Parties on a conservative and cooperative line.

Major opposition to U.S. designs came not from Russia (except in Eastern Europe) but from three trends within Western society itself. The first was the leftist upsurge which followed in the wake of war's destruction and dislocation all over the world. Where the Left succeeded in gaining power, in Eastern Europe, China, and North Korea, the U.S. was effectively excluded from their national economies. It was, not surprisingly, a major concern of American policy-makers to make certain it did not happen elsewhere.

The second trend which threatened to frustrate U.S. designs was the "dollar gap" which left Europe without the means to buy American goods for purposes of reconstruction. The various governments coped with their poverty in the same manner as they had during the world depression: through trading among themselves by means of bilateral agreements which did not require

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the use of dollars. This trend frightened the United States because it threatened to crystallize into a trading pattern which would permanently exclude America from the markets of Europe.

The third problem was the difficulty which American officials faced in managing public opinion in their own country. The administration and State Department, shouldering the responsibility of guarding and reconstructing the world capitalist system, found their own capitalists and the Congressmen who represented them jealous in guarding their own domestic markets, hostile to "give-away" aid programs, and apparently indifferent to the larger issue of the preservation of U.S. export markets. This is where the "Cold War" came in. The U.S. administration discovered as early as 1946, through experience in ramming a large loan to Great Britain through Congress, that that body would not respond to the real and burning issue of redistributing dollars to preserve American export markets, but would fork over the money willingly if the question were posed in terms of anti-Communism. "It was only the fear of Russia and Communism, a weak and irrelevant argument the administration did not believe and had not exploited, that finally swung the critical number of Senate and especially House members to vote for the bill." (p. 68) As a result of this experience, the administration learned that the easiest way to get needed economic programs passed was to invoke the Soviet specter; and that whipping up a crisis mentality was useful anytime a large sum for foreign aid was desired.

Although meaty chapters are devoted to the Middle and Far East, Europe is the geographical focus of this book (as it was of American foreign policy in that era), and the discussion of the Marshall Plan is its centerpiece. The Marshall Plan was America's belated (1947) response to the realization that European reconstruction was going to be a heavier task than had been anticipated. It had the primary function of distributing dollars to permit Europe to import from the United States; it also, not so incidentally, gave the United States a lever with which to control the direction of European development, separately and collectively. As a stick to complement the carrot of dollar grants, Washington made known its intention of sponsoring the rehabilitation of German industrial production, which knocked awry the export plans of France and Great Britain and revived all Europe's fear of German militarism. As a bonus for the United States, the plan offered the long-shot chance of luring even the Eastern European countries into a Western-oriented program and thus reopening them to capitalist trade and investment. The gamble

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almost worked; it certainly tempted Czechoslovakia and Poland in their hunger for foreign exchange, but Moscow vetoed the idea, and the eventual effect of the Marshall Plan was the decisive economic division of Europe into East and West. The aid program was sold to the U.S. Congress, which had been softened up by a manufactured crisis over Greece and the "Truman Doctrine," as an urgent anti-Communist measure.

The Marshall Plan failed, however, in its brief lifetime, to revive the productive power of Europe. This was due in part to the orthodox fiscal management which the United States insisted that aid recipients follow, and in part to an economic recession in the United States itself which curtailed demand for Europe's exports and intensified protectionist pressures in America. Congress was by this time already soured on economic aid; the situation demonstrated, according to the Kolkos, "the failure of strictly economic means, within the framework of capitalist alternatives, to keep the vast productive capacity of the United States and Western Europe from sinking into the mire of stagnation, if not depression." (p. 476)

Congress could, however, be frightened into voting more billions of dollars for rearmament, and thus NATO was born. According to the Kolkos, to the U.S. administration NATO was the functional substitute for Marshall Plan economic aid; to the Europeans it was an alliance against Germany; while to the American Congress and public it was touted as a military necessity to bolster Europe's defense against the Soviet Union.

This summary has not touched upon many subjects covered in exhaustive detail in the book: the Middle East, Eastern Europe, China, Japan, and Korea, to mention only the geographical areas to which whole chapters are devoted. The work ends rather abruptly in 1953 rather than 1954, with most of the narrative threads dangling. The Korean War is discussed, both in its own right and as a sort of *deus ex machina* which rescued Japan and Europe from economic stagnation (and in the process allowed Germany to steal export markets from France and Britain, which were using their factories to produce arms for NATO). The Korean War also forced the "agonizing reappraisal" of America's "Europe First" policy and marked a shift of attention to the Third World as the major source of danger to America's global plans. As the Soviet Union by that time had developed the atomic bomb, the scare tactics of the Cold War had become too dangerous to continue, so that "war with the Third World became the only conflict the United States dared to accept." (p. 716) Al-

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though all these reasons might justify the conclusion of the volume, one suspects that the authors set out to cover a ten-year span and flagged, exhausted, just about two years short of their goal. Perhaps they will pick up the threads of the story in another volume.

The importance of this work makes its presentation particularly disappointing. The Kolkos' peculiar style of writing practically guarantees that the book will be of minimal use to either the lay reader or the specialist. The former will find its length and, much more, the very concentrated style, which assumes great familiarity with all the various subjects, prohibitively difficult. The brief summary above does not do justice to the richness of the work's subject matter but is clearer and more concise than anything which can be found in the book itself.

The precedessor volume, Gabriel Kolko's *The Politics of War 1943-1945* was even worse in this respect. In that book the indigestion of fact reached a new high; virtually no attempt was made to summarize the book as a whole or its individual chapters. In this volume the attempt has been made, and the authors are to be commended for a step in the right direction. But this work covers a much longer time span, its theses are much more complex, and its relevance to contemporary problems makes its subject far more important. Compared with this volume, the first one is a mere prologue. The authors have tried to cover in the space of a chapter subsection—sometimes in only a paragraph or a sentence—topics upon which entire monographs could be written, such as the Communist "coup" in Czechoslovakia or the defeat of the International Trade Organization. The material would fit more comfortably within six or even a dozen volumes, and could have been so presented without sacrificing the unifying vision.

The researcher with a specialist's interest in certain topics will find the book indispensable but infuriating. The citation of sources seems calculated to make it impossible to track down the source of any single item: long paragraphs of perhaps 250 words each, densely packed with sensational quotations and controversial interpretations, are followed by a single number; and the corresponding note in the back of the book may contain as many as a dozen references to manuscript collections scattered throughout the United States and in London. The authors report that they have "deposited reproductions of a substantial proportion of the manuscripts cited here in the Library of the London School of Economics and Political Science and the York University

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Library, Toronto." This may save a few trips to Abilene, Kansas, and Norfolk, Virginia, for scholars who are not daunted by this abuse of the practice of multiple citation.

On the highest level of abstraction, the Kolkos have a unifying theme of American power and its frustrations, and several highly controversial subthemes. At the lowest level there is a mass of facts and immediate interpretations of those facts. There are, unfortunately, great gaps between the two levels, indicating a failure on the part of the authors to think out thoroughly the structure of their argument. This leads to much confusion, many inconsistencies, and a few flatout contradictions. For example, on page 400, Yugoslavia's decision to close its borders to the Greek revolutionaries in July 1949 is explained as the price paid for a trade agreement with the United States. It is implied that this decision was critical to the outcome of the Greek revolution. A few pages later, in a new chapter, we are told that the Yugoslavs were very displeased with the victory of a Moscow-oriented leadership in the rebel movement and so had their own reasons to deny aid; and it is admitted that the Greek resistance was in the process of destroying itself and alienating its mass base, and that "the internal jockeying and purging meant certain political defeat . . . and inevitably military collapse in its wake." (pp. 411, 410)

Similarly, the U.S. decision to permit the rehabilitation of Japanese industry, which required abandonment of the quixotic democratic reforms of the first two years of the occupation, is explained on page 538 as a response to the inevitable loss of China to the West and the need for a countervailing power in Asia. This is the conventional explanation for the Occupation's "reverse course" in Japan, which however, on page 519, the authors have already refuted in favor of the theory that supporting the Japanese government was just too expensive for the United States. "The political developments in China, while not the cause of the shift, only accentuated the urgency of Japanese industrial recovery." But would the shift have occurred even if the Japanese government had been fiscally conservative, and the occupation not so costly? If so, the novelty of the explanation loses some of its force.

The discussion of NATO's military function, or rather lack of it, is a major theme of the work. The Kolkos make it very clear that the number of troops Europe could put together could make no difference at all to the military equation of the two behemoths, America and Russia. This point is essential to their theory that NATO's real function was economic, not military: the continuance of the Marshall Plan redistribution of dollars by

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the only means palatable to Congress, the anti-Communist crusade; and they are very convincing. But then, after they have wrapped up this point, it is all undermined by two sentences (pp. 660-661):

Given strategic air power's total dependence on bases at this time, there was no real dichotomy between NATO's minimal ground forces and the United States' dependence on nuclear bombs. Apart from everything else, the United States needed bases in Europe and elsewhere, and even the air force admitted that ground forces were crucial to its own protection.

Well, of course! The dozing reader/reviewer is jolted awake. Haven't we known all along that NATO's military function was bases, not marching troops? The authors have demolished a straw man. As in the case of Japan, they have only added a supplementary explanation to the accepted one; they have not truly replaced it.

In their eagerness to contradict the emphasis in most historical writing on the Cold War with Russia they go, I think, too far in the opposite direction. Certainly the United States faced serious resistance both from national capitalism and from socialist currents that were not controlled by the Cominform; this insight is a badly needed dimension in our perception of American imperialism. U.S. officials were not, however, so totally mistaken in their choice of enemy—nor were they pushed into it by "public opinion," which remained for several years friendly toward the Soviet Union as a wartime ally. If America's aim was to open the world for its trade and investment, then Russia was responsible for thwarting this intention in Eastern Europe; and its own autonomous state-controlled economy represented the very core of the problem. No matter how pacific and conciliatory Stalin might be, the simple facts of Russia's industrial and military power and the historical inspiration of the October Revolution meant that its very existence was the fundamental threat. "If the Soviet Union had not existed" is a phrase often used by the Kolkos. We might complete the sentence ourselves: "then it would have quickly been invented," both as a villain by the Americans and as hero to America's opponents. If the Soviet Union is no longer a threat today, it is not least because more authentic heroes and villains have emerged.

Other important questions are suggested by this work, but go unanswered in the confusion of detail. Why, if the European nations were so surely on the road to recovery without U.S. dol-

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lars, was their situation so "desperate" that they leaped without hesitation toward the bonanza of dollars, accepting the accompanying control with scarcely a whimper? Why did the United States pay, with generous *grant aid,* for the reconstruction of just those nations that were bound to become its own most avaricious rivals for markets and raw materials, while denying the same liberal terms to much weaker lands? Is the Korean War boom really a sufficient explanation for the European and Japanese recovery from the deflationary policies America had forced upon them?

The answers to these questions may be hiding somewhere in the text, disguised in the proliferation of minor theses and multiple explanations. By overqualifying and oversubtilizing their arguments the Kolkos often lose the power to persuade the open-minded reader, but lose none of the power to irritate the critic who may have a narrower vision but more depth in a particular subject. History is full of stubborn inconsistencies, and simplification is a form of falsification but also the indispensable research and pedagogical method. From the clash of a sharply defined thesis and counter-thesis we may obtain something closer to the truth than the mass of empirical data we must begin with. A more cleanly sketched argument makes a more exposed target for the critics, but it also sticks longer in the mind of the reader.

If I personally am convinced (despite these quibbles) of the correctness and the importance of the Kolkos' vision, it is less because they have demonstrated it in convincing and logical fashion than because it corresponds so well with what I know of the motives of U.S. foreign policy in other areas and other eras. Postwar European history is a boring topic as conventionally presented; the Kolkos have added an exciting new dimension by asking of it the questions which have revolutionized the study of the Third World from "development" studies to imperialism studies. It is because their contribution is so important that I would beg them to make it more accessible by devoting more attention to the structure and logic of their presentation, to say nothing of its readability.

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(*Continued from inside front cover*)

lytical significance of separating out the private trade deficit is that it gives a more realistic view of the dimensions of the problem. Thus the most important *potential* contribution of dollar devaluation is to overcome the non-government-financed merchandise trade deficit, by making prices of exports more competitive in foreign currencies and imports more expensive for U.S. buyers. Dollar devaluation is far from a cure-all for even the merchandise trade balance, since such imports as oil and gas will probably not be reduced because of increasing costs, and the demand abroad for many of the technologically advanced U.S. exports will not necessarily be increased by somewhat lower prices. Apart from the limited extent to which dollar devaluation might contribute to the reduction or elimination of the balance-of-payments deficit in merchandise trade, it is important to recognize that the official Department of Commerce data, by blurring the distinction between government and private sectors, greatly underestimate the real deficit that needs to be overcome. All this of course is on top of the contribution made by the costs of U.S. empire to the balance-of-payments deficit. (Here dollar devaluation tends to *enlarge* the deficit, since the costs in U.S. dollars to pay for foreign military bases and operations increase as the value of the dollar in terms of foreign currency decreases.)

While Table 2 in the December *Review of the Month* was clearly labeled "Private Sector," we were at fault in not explaining how and why these data differ from the official government statistics. This oversight probably contributed to the error made in the January 1973 *Review of the Month*, where we said, "During the first three quarters of 1972 the trade deficit was running at an annual average of over $7 billion (compared to $6.2 billion in 1971). . . ." This comparison understates the increase in the trade deficit, since the 1972 estimate was based on the official data combining the government and private sectors, while, as explained above, the 1971 figure was for the private sector alone. In fact, the 1972 trade deficit for the private sector, calculated on the same basis, was in the neighborhood of $10 billion.

In response to a request for a statement on the late African leader Amilcar Cabral from the editors of *Ufahamu*, published by the African Activist Association at the University of California in Los Angeles, we wrote:

"The vile murder of Amilcar Cabral by the agents of imperialism is a blow to the African Revolution and a source of great sorrow to his millions of friends and admirers all over the world. But it is too late for imperialism to be able to hope to change the course of history by such treacherous tactics. Guinea Bissao is already largely liberated, and Cabral's creative revolutionary ideas have struck deep roots throughout the African continent. Worthy successors will come forward to take his place, and the struggle will go on until final victory. All of us at MONTHLY REVIEW join in paying high tribute to a great man and a great revolutionary."

In this connection we would like to call attention to a service which many MR readers might find valuable. It is provided by the Liberation Support Movement Information Center, Box 338, Richmond, B.C., Canada. To quote from a recent LSM circular, "LSM Information Center is non-profit and staffed entirely by voluntary labor. Your subscription and donations enable us to continue to produce LSM materials, e.g., articles, interviews, documents and speeches, posters, etc. on the liberation movements in Southern Africa; to reproduce movement bulletins for North American distribution and also to print and ship textbooks and pamphlets as requested by the liberation movements [of Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea Bissao] for their internal use." All interested persons are invited to write to the above address for further information, including lists of available publications and other materials.

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